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4Abstract
Social structure affects the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. Here we study the
evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in fragmented societies, and show that conjoining segregated
cooperation-inhibiting groups, if done properly, rescues the fate of collective cooperation. We
highlight the essential role of inter-group ties, that sew the patches of the social network together
and facilitate cooperation. We point out several examples of this phenomenon in actual settings.
We explore random and non-random graphs, as well as empirical networks. In many cases we
find a marked reduction of the critical benefit-to-cost ratio needed for sustaining cooperation. Our
finding gives hope that the increasing worldwide connectivity, if managed properly, can promote
global cooperation.
1. INTRODUCTION
A core problem in evolutionary game theory is that of cooperation. Cooperation involves
individuals paying a cost to benefit others, and is a ubiquitous feature of the social life [1], [2].
The structure of social networks affect pathways of information, exchange, and other interper-
sonal mechanisms which undergird cooperation [2]. Thus a natural question in the mathematical
study of evolutionary dynamics of cooperation is how network structure influences collective
cooperative outcomes [1], [5]–[8].
Here we look at the evolution of cooperation from a new perspective. We ask the question of
how the interconnection between segregated groups can promote cooperation. Similar to indi-
viduals forming groups towards collective individually-implausible accomplishments, sometimes
groups come together to form larger composite structures. Examples abound throughout history,
from trade and intermarriage relations between tribes and communities in antiquity, to the waves
of globalization which increasingly connect local entities for economic, cultural, and technolog-
ical exchange. Another example is project management at different levels in corporations and
organizations, which involves the cooperative division of labor between sparsely-interconnected
distinctly-specialized units.
We use the framework of evolutionary graph theory [1], [6], [7] to study settings where groups
that are individually undesirable for cooperation can be conjoined to build larger cooperation-
promoting structures. We first study the conjoining of cohesive communities (clique-like structurally-
homogeneous groups) under different connection schemes. We then focus on extremely-heterogeneous
structures. We study stars and their various interconnection schemes, as well as rich clubs,
5and introduce ensuing topologies that are super-promoters of cooperation. Then we focus on
bipartite graphs. In addition to these ideal graph families, we consider several random graph
models. Finally, we consider empirical social networks and investigate the role of community
structure on the evolution of cooperation. The findings are consistent across topologies: sparse
interconnections of cooperation-inhibiting graphs leads to composite structures that are better
for the evolution of cooperation.
Under the framework of mathematical graph theory, social structure is described by a graph,
in which nodes represent individuals and links represent interactions and/or relations. In the
simplest setting, individuals are conventionally envisaged with two possible strategies pertaining
to a 2× 2 context-specific payoff matrix which characterizes their interaction. The outcomes of
these interactions (‘games’) determine the ‘fitness’ values of the individuals: those who accrue
more benefits are endowed with higher fitness, which governs their influence over the peers’
choices of strategy. The most stringent form of cooperation is found in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) game, in which individuals are either cooperators (paying a cost c and bestowing benefit
b > c upon the interaction partner) or defectors (who seek to benefit without paying a cost). The
analysis throughout this paper uses the so-called ‘donation game’ version of PD (as shall be
discussed, generalization to arbitrary symmetric 2-player games is straightforward). In this game,
mutual cooperation has payoff b− c, unilateral cooperation has payoff −c for the cooperator and
b for the defector, and mutual defection has payoff 0. The ratio b/c characterizes the trade-off
players face. Throughout this paper, without loss of generality, we set c = 1. This is simply
equivalent to a change of scale in payoffs, and helps brevity of notation. The strategies of the
agents change according to death-birth (dB) updating: a random individual is chosen to update;
it adopts one of the the neighbors’ strategies proportional to payoff. The small ‘d’ indicates that
death is random, while the large ‘B’ indicates that birth is under selection. The probability that
the chosen node copies the strategy of neighbor y is proportional to 1 + δpiy, where δ denotes
the selection strength and piy is the average payoff that node y gleans playing with its own
neighbors. We consider the limit of weak selection. To see if natural selection favors or hinders
collective cooperation, we must calculate the probability that a single cooperator emerging at a
random place in the network takes over the population. Natural selection favors cooperation if
this fixation probability exceeds that of the fixation probability of a defector. Otherwise, natural
selection inhibits cooperation.
Before we proceed, we point out a central feature of network models of cooperation, such
6as ours. In these models, social influence spreads beyond immediate neighbors. In conventional
models of social contagion, such as simple contagion models, which often describe information
diffusion, and complex contagion models, which often describe spread of behaviors [11], [12],
the ego’s activation probability depends on the states of the alters. An activated alter exerts the
same influence on the ego regardless of the states of the neighbors of that alter. For example, in
the simple-contagion model of information diffusion, the ego needs to have heard the news from
only one alter to have become informed, and is agnostic to how many neighbors of that alter
have heard the news. Or in threshold models of complex contagion, the ego is activated once
a certain number or fraction of alters are activated, regardless of the ego’s second neighbors.
In contrast, due to the strategic nature of cooperative dynamics, in our model, the radius of
influence is two [13]. Ego is influenced directly by the strategies of the alters (from whom ego
copies its strategy), and also indirectly by those of the neighbors of each alter (who contribute
to the payoff of that alter). Our model, with a setting similar to the previous theoretical [1],
[5]–[7] and experimental [3], [4] studies of human cooperation, thereby adds a strategic element
to pure imitation dynamics. Our model shares one similarity with simple contagion processes:
having one alter who has adopted each of the strategies makes the ego’s adoption probability
for that strategy nonzero.
A recently-discovered formulation gives the exact condition under which natural selection
favors cooperation on a given network [1]. The solution utilizes the mathematical equivalence of
the problem to that of coalescing random walks on the graph, and the solution is in terms of the
remeeting times of random walkers initiated at each node. In the Methods section, we provide a
brief overview of the framework. For a given network, the framework produces a quantity (which
we denote by b∗) that determines the fate of cooperation. For any network, we have |b∗| > 1.
If b∗ is positive, then b∗ is the critical benefit-to-cost ratio. That is, natural selection favors the
fixation of cooperation over that of defection on the given network if the benefit-to-cost-ratio is
greater than b∗. The closer b∗ is to unity, the better the network is for promoting cooperation.
Conversely, if b∗ is negative, natural selection inhibits cooperation for any benefit-to-cost ratio. In
these cases, the network promotes ‘spite’ instead of cooperation. That is, individuals are willing
to pay a cost to reduce the payoff of others. The closer the value of b∗ is to −1, the more
strongly the network promotes spite. The convention of the literature has hitherto been using b∗
to characterize the conduciveness of networks for cooperation [1], [1], [4], [6], [7]. In the SI,
we remark that 1/b∗ can also be used, we discuss the advantages of each measure, and we find
7that some of the numerical results are visually better presentable using 1/b∗ instead of b∗. For
consistency with the previous literature, we use b∗ to present the results in the main text.
We consider distinct settings in which structures that are known to inhibit cooperation can
be connected under various schemes to create larger structures that promote cooperation. In the
main text, for brevity, we only provide the simplified version of the results in the large-n limit
(that is, the leading term), and present the full expressions in the corresponding Supplementary
material. We use the terminology of asymptotic analysis throughout. We say b∗ grows as anb,
denoted b∗ ∼ anb, if limn→∞ b∗/(anb) = 1. Equivalently, we call anb the leading term of b∗.
2. COHESIVE COMMUNITIES
Suppose there is a complete graph (clique) of n nodes. For a clique, selection does not favor
cooperation, regardless of b. Namely, the value of b∗ that the method gives is negative. This
means that cliques promote spite.
In real-world networks, communities can join together to form larger structures that are better
for cooperation. Suppose there are two cliques (which for simplicity we consider to be of the
same size, and the analytical steps for the general case are the same) and we connect a node
from the first one to a node in the second one (Fig. 1a). We call these two nodes ‘gate nodes’,
and the rest of the nodes in the two communities ‘commoners’. In organizational settings, for
example, these gate nodes are called ‘boundary spanners’. They are essential for intergroup
flow of information and ideas, intergroup coordination and collaboration, and organizational
effectiveness and novelty [14]. For two communities of size n with the described interconnection,
b∗ is positive and finite, but it grows as 1× n2. Thus it is in principle possible that natural
selection favors cooperation, but the necessary b∗ grows quickly with network size. This might
be infeasible for actual settings. Connecting the gate nodes via an intermediary ‘broker’ node
(Fig. 1b) reduces the leading term to (2/5)× n2, which is slightly better, but it still grows
quickly with n. Marked reduction of b∗ ensues if instead of one broker, there are two brokers
on the path between the gate nodes (Fig. 1c). Each group is connected to a third-party trustee
node, or representative, and exchange is done via these two nodes. With two broker nodes in the
middle, then the leading term of b∗ drops to 4n, thus b∗ grows considerably slower with network
size. This interconnection scheme offers a substantial improvement and the two communities
which individually promote spite can now be conjoined to form a new composite network which
supports cooperation with more plausible values of b∗.
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Fig. 1: From spite to cooperation by conjoining cliques. Cohesive communities (cliques) hinder the flourishing of cooperation.
Each clique promotes spiteful behavior. Conjoining cliques to build larger networks facilitates cooperation. This figure illustrates
several topologies of conjoining two (a-d) or multiple (e-g) cliques to build composite cooperation-promoting structures. If we
connect two cliques, either directly (a) or via an intermediary node (b), then the composite structure is a promoter of cooperation:
the critical benefit-to-cost ratio, b∗, grows with the square of the clique size, n2. This is a steep increase of b∗ with network size,
thus although cooperation is in principle possible, it might be impractical for actual settings. (c) Having two intermediary nodes
leads to further improvement: the critical benefit-to-cost ratio now grows linearly with n. This is a much slower increase of b∗
with network size, as compared to the previous case. Thus, this is a more desirable interconnection scheme for actual scenarios.
(d) The broker node who bridges two cliques can also be connected to leaf nodes. In this case, too, b∗ grows linearly with n.
The following conjoining schemes for multiple cliques produce composite structures that promote cooperation with a critical
benefit-to-cost ratio, b∗, that grows linearly with the size of individual cliques. (e) A broker node connects multiple cliques. (f)
A ring of cliques which represents the ‘caveman graph’. (g) Hierarchical organization of cliques.
9Longer chains of intermediary nodes between the two cliques is mathematically possible,
but relatively less common in actual settings. The possible exceptions are chain-of-command
structures which resemble this topology: a group of decision-makers sit at one end (the first
clique) and through a chain of intermediary units, the agenda reaches the bottom-most unit (the
second clique) which is in charge of implementation. For chains with more than two intermediary
nodes, the analytical results become too lengthy to be presented. But fortunately the employed
coalescing random walks framework enables numerical extraction of the leading term. If the
chain of intermediaries has length L, with L  n, then the leading term of b∗ drops further
to n× 4/(L− 1). The results for intermediate values of L, with the possibility of L > n, are
presented in the SI.
There are also alternative intercommunity connection schemes that offer a marked reduction
in b∗. For example, if there is one broker node between the gate nodes, and the broker is
connected to m > 1 peripheral leaf nodes (Fig. 1d), then the leading term of b∗ is given by
n(m+ 2)(m+ 5)/[m(m+ 3)], which is linear in n.
In actual settings, often there are more than two communities (local social networks, production
units, etc.). Urbanization has led to a proliferation of diverse subcultures and enhanced interaction
and diffusion between them as a daily principle of contemporary life [15], [16]. In organizational
settings, ‘network brokers’ can bridge existing ‘structural holes’ and connect multiple segregated
sectors and facilitate cooperation among them [17], [18]. An simple example of such a setting
would be a star of cliques: m > 2 communities connected via a highly-central broker node
(Fig. 1e). With this m-community structure, with m > 2 communities, b∗ has the leading term
n ×m/(m − 2). Linear growth in community size n indicates a substantial improvement over
a single community or two communities is attained.
Another interconnection scheme of multiple cohesive communities is the so-called ‘caveman
graph’ from the sociological literature [19] (Fig. 1f). With L > 2 cliques, situated on a ring, the
leading term of b∗ is given by n× L/(L− 2), which is linear in clique size.
Cliques can also be organized hierarchically, such as in modern organizational bureaucracies
(Fig. 1g). In this case, too, for large cliques, the leading term of b∗ grows linearly with clique
size, as shown in Fig. 1g.
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3. STAR-LIKE STRUCTURES
A star graph comprises a hub and n leaf nodes connected to the hub. In this strictly-centralized
system, natural selection does not promote cooperation regardless of b. Similar to the case of
cliques, stars can be connected to promote collective cooperation. If we have two stars, one with
n leaf nodes and the other with αn leaf nodes (Fig. 2a), then if we connect the hubs, b∗ for
large n approaches a constant (8 + α + 1/α)/4. The smallest possible b∗ for two stars is 5/2,
which pertains to α = 1 (identical stars). The independence from network size is a remarkable
feature that star structures exhibit.
If we connect the hubs via one intermediary broker node, we get b∗ ∼ (10 + α + 1/α)/4. For
two identical stars, this simplifies to b∗ ∼ 3. We can also connect the hubs via a chain of L
intermediary brokers, such as in a chain-of-command structure with a decision-making unit at
the top and and an implementation unit at the bottom. For L ≥ 1, the leading term of b∗ is
given by (8 + 2L+ α + 1/α)/(L+ 3). In all these cases, it is remarkable that for large network
size, b∗ tends to a constant. This independence from network size evinces the high merit of
locally-star-like structures in the promotion of cooperation.
In many actual settings, star-like structures are not directly connected as we envisaged above.
Rather, global hubs are connected to local large-scale hubs, which are in turn connected to local
peripheral nodes. This leads to a hierarchical organization: the head unit connects to a number
of subsidiary units, each of them connect in turn to subordinate units, and so an. To study this
interconnection scheme, we consider graphs with megahubs and hubs in a nested manner. We
consider only two levels, though the calculation can be in principle extended to more. Out of
the n total leaf nodes of a star graph, we take ng of them and attach nd nodes to each (Fig. 2b).
The total number of nodes will be 1 + n+ ngnd, and the number of links is n + ngnd. The
full expressions for b∗ are long (presented in the SI, Section S2.D), but simplifications can be
obtained in some interesting limits. We consider the case where the number of leaf nodes are
much larger than the number of hubs. This is the case in many actual settings, to the extent
that the marked imbalance between the latter two numbers constitutes the cornerstone of many
egalitarian social discourses and movements. If we have ng  n, then the leading term of b∗
approaches 3/2. Whether nd and n are of the same order of magnitude, or if we haven  nd,
only affects the second leading order terms. This leading behavior of b∗ is particularly interesting
because the average degree approaches 2 in these cases, and b∗ being less than the average degree
11
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Fig. 2: Super-promoters of cooperation. Star graphs represent extreme core-periphery structures where a central node is
connected to many leaf nodes. Although a single star hinders cooperation, connecting stars promotes cooperation. All reported
critical benefit-to-cost ratios, b∗, pertain to the limit of large population size. Exact formulas are presented in the SI, Section S2.
(a) Two stars, one with n leaf nodes and the other with αn leaf nodes. (b) An imperfect meta-star: a central node has n peripheral
nodes, ng of them are hubs, while nd of them are leaves. If ng  n nd, then b∗ tends to 3/2 and the average degree tends
to 2. Thus, the structure is a super-promoter of cooperation, since b∗ is less than the average degree. (c) The perfect meta-star
is a hierarchical structure with a head node connected to n subsidiary nodes, each of them connected to nd peripheral nodes.
The reported result is for the case n  nd, which means most of the population belongs to the bottom layer. (d) A more
flat hierarchical structure: there are m head nodes connected on a ring, each with n peripheral nodes. For m  n, this graph
becomes a super-promoter of cooperation, outperforming the strict hierarchy.
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is a rare property of graphs. Hence we can dub these structures ‘super-promoters’ of cooperation.
We can readily generalize these results to the fully-hierarchical structure (where ng = n), that
is, a star of stars (Fig. 2c). A mega-hub is connected to n hubs which are each connected to
nd leaf nodes. In the limit of n  nd, b∗ approaches 2, which indicates that this structure is a
strong promoter of cooperation. Full results are presented in the SI, Section S2.E.
Hierarchies can also be more ‘flat’, which is getting popular in certain management ap-
proaches [20]. The simplest model would be to have the upper layer of nodes connect horizontally
instead of hierarchically. We consider the simple case where the hubs of m stars, each with n
leaf nodes, are connected on a ring (Fig. 2d). For large n, the leading term of b∗ approaches
(3m− 1)/(2m− 2), which is independent of n. This means that for large m, the value of b∗
approaches 3/2. The average degree in this limit approaches 2. Hence, a ring of stars is another
super-promoter of cooperation. The full results for this setup are presented in the SI, Section S2.I.
4. THE RICH CLUB
A rich-club network is one comprised of a small dense core of connection-rich high-degree
nodes and a large sparse periphery. These structures are found across social and technological
networks. The notion of ‘oligarchy’ in institutions and organizations is usually linked to structures
that can be characterized by such a rich-club feature [21]. Other examples with this feature
include the social network of company executives and directors (within-company [22], national
inter-company [23], and international inter-company [24]), the collaboration network between
academics [25], and the Internet [26].
As a simple example with this characteristic, we consider a clique of nc nodes (where c
denotes ‘core’) and np peripheral nodes. Each core node is connected to every other core node
and every peripheral node. Each peripheral node is connected to every core node but to none of
the other peripheral nodes. In the special case of nc = 1, this becomes a star graph. For a single
rich-club network, natural selection does not favor cooperation, regardless of b. Similar to the
case of a single clique, single rich-club networks promote spite.
To improve the situation, we connect two rich-club networks by connecting a ‘gate’ node in the
first core to a gate node in the second (Fig. 3a). An actual example of conjoining rich clubs via
cores is that director networks of different companies often connect, and they do so predominantly
via their cores, rather than the peripheries—creating ‘interlocked directorates’ [27]. In the simple
case of two identical rich-club networks with nc  np (small core and large periphery), the
13
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Fig. 3: Rich clubs and bipartite graphs. (a) Rich-club graphs comprise a dense core and a large, sparse periphery. A single rich
club hinders cooperation, but conjoined rich clubs promotes cooperation. For the simple case of two identical rich clubs, with
the periphery size, np, much larger than the core, nc, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio b∗ grows linearly with nc. (b) Complete
bipartite graphs comprise two distinct groups of nodes, where links exist only between the two groups, but not within each
group. Examples are buyer-seller networks or heterosexual marriage networks. A single bipartite graph hinders cooperation, but
connecting them promotes cooperation. For the simple case of two identical graphs, each with two groups of the same size, b∗
grows linearly with group size n.
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leading term of b∗ is given by 4nc − 3/2, which is a linear function of nc. That is, the leading
behavior in the large-np limit only depends on the number of core nodes and is independent
of the number of peripheral nodes. In the case of nc = 1, this leading term is 5/2, which is
consistent with our previous findings for star graphs. For nc = 2, the leading term of b∗ is 13/2.
The results point out a remarkable feature of these structures: when the periphery is large, the
fate of the collective outcome is determined solely by the core.
5. BIPARTITE STRUCTURES
In a bipartite network, nodes can be divided into two distinct groups, where there is no intra-
group link. For example, traditional heterosexual marriage networks comprised two disjoint sets;
males only connected to females and vice versa. Other examples include buyer/seller [28], and
employer/employee [29] bipartite networks.
Here we present the results for the simplest case of a bipartite graph which is analytically
tractable: we consider a complete bipartite graph. A complete bipartite network is one which
has two groups, and each node is connected to every node in the other group but no node in
its own group. Natural selection does not promote cooperation on a complete bipartite graph,
regardless of b. If we connect two bipartite networks, however, the situation improves (Fig. 3b).
Consider a bipartite graph comprising two groups of nodes with sizes nx and ny, respectively.
Suppose we connect two identical such bipartite graphs by connecting a type-x node in the first
graph in a type-x node in the second. In the special case of nx = ny = n, b∗ grows linearly
with n. The leading term of b∗ in this case is given by 2n. Alternatively, if nx  ny, then the
leading term of b∗ only depends on nx, and is given by 4nx− 3/2. Hence, similar to rich clubs,
if a large group of nodes are not interconnected within themselves and are all connected only
to another small group of nodes, the collective outcome will be determined by that small group.
6. RANDOM GRAPHS AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL NETWORKS
Since actual social networks typically have more randomness than the ideal structured consid-
ered above, we investigate random networks to check if they have qualitatively similar properties.
Our first test (discussed in the SI, Section S8) is to add structural noise to the above-considered
topologies and verify that the b∗ values are indeed robust against structural deviations. For
the next check, we investigate how conjoining cooperation-inhibiting random networks can
promote cooperation. We generate 10 random Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs [30], with values of b∗ that are
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Fig. 4: Conjoining random graphs and empirical networks. a) Conjoining two Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs directly (lower
triangle) and via one broker node (upper triangle). b) Extension to more than two graphs: four ER graphs with link-formation
probabilities 0.8 (top left), 0.7 (top right), 0.45 (bottom right), and 0.35 (bottom left). The inter-community link probability is
0.01. c) Conjoining two scale-free networks generated by the model of Klemm and Eguiluz [31]. d) An example network with
community structure generated by the LFR benchmark [6]. Four empirical friendship networks (e-h). We employed standard
community detection algorithms to partition the data set into communities, and calculated b∗ for the whole network and for
each community separately. In every case, the whole network is better than individual subnetworks in promoting cooperation.
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undesirable for cooperation: negative (promoting spite) or highly positive (hindering cooperation).
Network size is fixed at 40. There are 55 possible network pairs (45 pairs in which the two
networks are different and 10 pairs in which they are identical), and there are 1600 ways to
conjoin two networks via one gate node in each. We calculate the median value of b∗ among all
these possible conjoinings for each pair of networks. The lower triangle in Fig. 4a presents the
resulting b∗ of the conjoined network against the b∗ of the first and the second network. The upper
triangle presents the results for the same procedure, except the gate nodes are connected via one
broker node, instead of being directly connected. It can be seen that in most cases, a substantial
improvement is achieved in both conjoining schemes. The most resistant case is the one with
b∗ = −50. Note that networks whose b∗ is negative are promoters of spite, and the closer to
zero the value of b∗ is, the more strongly the structure promotes spite. The results indicate that
if the spite-promotion capacity of either group is high, conjoining them would be less helpful
collectively. In Fig. 4b we illustrate that the conjoining mechanism works also for more than two
ER networks. In the example case shown, three of the four ER networks promote spite, and one
of them promotes cooperation with b∗ ≈ 43. Creating inter-community links between these four
groups with probability 0.01 begets a marked improvement: the overall structure has b∗ ≈ 14,
which is considerably better than each of the individual groups for promoting cooperation. A
generalization of this procedure gives rise to the stochastic block model, which we investigate
in the SI.
The same conjoining procedure is applicable to networks with heavy-tailed degree distri-
butions, which emulate actual social networks more realistically than ER networks. Here we
use the model proposed by Klemm and Eguiluz [31] to generate scale-free networks with both
small-world property and high clustering coefficient, which are both ubiquitous features in social
networks. The results are presented in Fig. 4c. Conjoining every pair of networks produces a
composite network with positive b∗. In the SI, we present results for four additional scale-free
models. The results are qualitatively similar, and the improvement in b∗ via conjoining ensues
consistently.
To study the effect of community structure on the cooperative outcome, we employ the
Lancichinetti-Fortunato-Radicchi (LFR) benchmark [6] that are used for comparing community-
detection algorithms. The procedure generates networks with community structure in which the
degree distribution within each community and the distribution of community sizes are both
heavy-tailed. Fig. 4d depicts an example case with 100 nodes divided into three communities.
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The degree distribution is scale-free with exponent 2. The community sizes are 10, 23, and 67.
Only the largest community has a positive b∗, with b∗ ≈ 99. The composite network (with mixing
parameter 0.1) has b∗ ≈ 35. In Supplementary Method 1.8, we provide a systematic investigation
for LFR networks and show that, consistent with the above findings, when communities are not
conducive to cooperation, sparse interconnections tend to generate composite networks better
than the individual modules.
We can apply the same mathematical formalism to real-world social network data. We use
offline social networks that pertain to friendships, to ascertain that cooperative dynamics would be
reasonable. We use two children friendship networks of fourth grade and fifth grade students [33],
[34] (for the third grade, no community structure is detected because the network is dense and
most people are friends with most others, so we did not use it). The second data set is the
well-known friendship network of the members of a Karate club [35], and the third data set we
use is Coleman’s classic highschool friendship network data set [36]. The results are presented
in Fig. 4, panels e-h (more detailed results are presented in Supplementary Table 1). We divided
the graphs into two communities using the Girvan-Newman method [37]. In cases where using
three as the number of communities returned meaningful results, we considered both two and
three communities separately. For all networks, the algorithm returned single-node communities
for more than three communities, so we did not consider those cases. In all cases, the collective
cooperative merit of the network is markedly better than that of the individual communities.
This reaffirms the advantageousness of inter-group connection vis-a`-vis cooperation.
7. DISCUSSION
Each population structure can be quantified according to its intrinsic propensity to promote
cooperation (paying a cost to benefit others) or spite (paying a cost to harm others) [1]. Here we
report the observation that sparsely conjoining cooperation-inhibiting structures tend to produce
cooperation-promoting structures. We have explored this effect when joining together fully
connected cliques, star-like structures (which are dominated by a single individual), rich-clubs,
and even random graphs. We have found the phenomenon in examples of real social networks
that already consist of conjoined sub-structures.
In our findings, conjoining two graphs that are already favorable for cooperation always results
in a cooperation-promoting composite structure, though sometimes the composite graph might
not promote cooperation as strongly as the two individual graphs did. But we did not find
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any example in which the composite graph would inhibit cooperation, that is, either with b∗
significantly larger than those of the two initial graphs, or with a negative b∗. We investigated
random and non-random graph families considered in this paper, and several others.
An extension to our work would be finding better conjoining schemes for cliques. Here we
showed that conjoining cliques in the manners described above results in composite networks
that are considerably better than individual cliques. These conjoining methods yield b∗ values
that grow linearly with n. For very large networks, this improvement might still not be enough.
A valuable extension would be to find structures that, similar to the case of stars and rich clubs,
would produce b∗ that reaches a constant for large clique size.
We note that evolutionary graph theory, which we employed in this paper, is a general approach
to study the effect of population structure on natural selection. It is not limited to any particular
game and not restricted to one shot interactions. The results are generalizable to any matrix
game (see Methods). Hence the competing strategies could instantiate repeated interactions and
conditional behavior [38]. Extensions of evolutionary graph theory can be used to study direct
reciprocity with crosstalk [39], and indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private
information [40]. On the other hand, there are social settings our model is not applicable to.
For example, if each individual interacts with only a subset of its neighbors, then exclusion and
inclusion become essential elements of network power. This is an important feature in Network
Exchange Theory [41]. In this case, broker nodes have leverage over others due to the high
exclusion/inclusion asymmetry. Our model does not consider the possibilities of exclusion and
inclusion, and each player plays with every neighbor. Thus an interesting extension to the present
paper would be to study analytically the said effects of exclusion/inclusion in a game-theoretical
setting to build on the previous experimental work, particularly Network Exchange Theory.
Finally, we highlight that our results are qualitatively consistent with several simulation
studies in the literature across different contexts: cooperation is promoted by interdependence
between networks in spatial public goods games and the Prisoner’s Dilemma on interdependent
networks [42]–[44], even if it is endogenous and inter-population links are only rewarded to
high-payoff individuals [45]. The same is true if multiple types of interactions are considered,
resulting in a multiplex network [46].
Our findings suggest a recipe for how to build societal structures that effectively promote
cooperation, and together with the ensemble of previous results in the literature, they engender
hope regarding the increasing interconnection of the contemporary world.
19
8. METHODS
We follow a recently-discovered framework for unweighted, undirected graphs without self-
loops [1]. Let us denote the degree of node x with kx and its set of neighbors by Nx. Then, we
define px as the probability that a random walk of length 2 initiated at node x will terminate at
node x:
px
def
=
1
kx
∑
y∈Nx
1
ky
. (1)
We then solve the following system of
(
N
2
)
linear equations for symmetric quantities τxy, which
are the meeting times of two random walkers initiated at nodes x and y:
τxy = τyx = (1− δxy)
[
1 +
1
2kx
∑
z∈Nx
τzy +
1
2ky
∑
z∈Ny
τzx
]
. (2)
Here, δxy equals unity if x = y and is zero otherwise. Using these quantities, we define τx for
each node as the expected remeeting time of two random walkers initiated at node x as follows:
τx
def
= 1 +
1
kx
∑
y∈Nx
τyx. (3)
The necessary condition for cooperation to be favored by natural selection is that b(
∑
x pxτxkx − 2Nk)
is greater than c(
∑
x τxkx − 2Nk). If the coefficient of b in this inequality is nonpositive,
cooperation is never favored. If the coefficient is positive, then the critical benefit-to-cost ratio
is given by the following relation:
b∗ =
∑
x τxkx − 2Nk∑
x pxτxkx − 2Nk
. (4)
The calculations for specific graphs discussed in the main text can be simplified utilizing their
structural symmetry. For example, for a single community (a complete graph), there is only
one variable: the remeeting time between any pair of nodes (because τxx values are zero). For
two communities connected directly by a link, there are only four distinct values for τxy: the
remeeting time between two commoners, between a commoner and the gate node of the same
community, between a commoner and the gate node of the other community, and between the
two gate nodes. This reduces Equation (6) to a system of four equations with four unknowns.
The results are generalizable to arbitrary 2×2 games [47]. For a game with strategies A and B
with corresponding payoff matrix R, S, T, P , the condition that natural selection favors strategy
A over B in the limit of weak selection is: (T − S) < (R− P )(b∗ + 1)/(b∗ − 1).
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For the KE networks used in Figure. 4c, we used the model of Klemm and Eguiluz [31].
We generated many networks, with the cross-over parameter µ and the number of initial active
nodes m both selected randomly in their valid ranges. We selected 6 networks whose b∗ differed
from the corresponding values used in Fig. 4 by less than 5%.
Data Availability. All the network data sets used in this paper are freely and publicly available
in The Colorado Index of Complex Networks (ICON) collection: https://icon.colorado.edu
Code Availability. For the LFR benchmark, we used the publicly-available code that the
authors of Ref. [6] have provided: https://sites.google.com/site/santofortunato/inthepress2
For the coalescing random walks framework, the code for computing b∗ is publicly available in
Zenodo at http://dx.doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.276933
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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
S1. STEPS FOR THE CALCULATION OF b∗
Here we repeat the formulas for convenience of reference. The return probability of a length-2
random walk staring at node x is:
px
def
=
1
kx
∑
y∈Nx
1
ky
. (5)
The system of recurrence equations for meeting times τxy are:
τxy = τyx = (1− δxy)
[
1 +
1
2kx
∑
z∈Nx
τzy +
1
2ky
∑
z∈Ny
τzx
]
. (6)
Using the solution of this system of linear equations, we obtain the remeeting times τx as
follows:
τx
def
= 1 +
1
kx
∑
y∈Nx
τyx. (7)
Then the critical benefit-to-cost ratio is given by the following relation:
b∗ =
∑
x τxkx − 2Nk∑
x pxτxkx − 2Nk
. (8)
Below we consider several different topologies and calculate the critical cost to benefit ratio
for them. Since some cases are nested within others, we could first solve the general cases and
then present others as special cases, but we chose to present the cases in increasing complexity
for pedagogical purposes.
A. Using b∗ and 1/b∗
The convention of the literature has been using b∗ to characterize the conduciveness of networks
for cooperation. We remark here that 1/b∗ can also be used, and it has two advantages: it is
confined to the range (−1, 1), and it is monotonic. We find that some of the results are visually
better presented using 1/b∗ instead of b∗. With this alternative measure, strong promoters of
spite (whose b∗ are negative but small in absolute value) will fall close to -1, weak promoters
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of spite will be close to zero but on the negative side, weak promoters of cooperation will be
close to zero but on the positive side, and strong promoters of cooperation will be close to
+1. Moreover, as we discuss here and as is shown in [1], for complete bipartite graphs b∗ is
infinite, and with the new measure, zero is assigned to these graphs. In this paper we use b∗ to
present the analytical results, to be consistent with the previous literature and for the results to
be easily comparable. It is also more intuitive because we fix the cost to c = 1 and practically,
one would seek the required benefit to inject into a system so that cooperation would flourish.
Although 1/b∗ is mathematically more suitable, b∗ is more readily interpretable. We use b∗ for
the analytical calculations in the main text and in the SI, and for some numerical results we
present both. In some numerical cases we find that 1/b∗ produces better visual comprehension,
so we use it instead of b∗ for producing those plots.
S2. STAR GRAPHS
A. Single star graph
Consider a star graph comprising a hub and n leafs. Due to symmetry, there are only two
remeeting time: τ`` between two leafs and τh` between a hub and a leaf. Let us write the system
of equations (6) for this network:τh` = 1 +
1
2n
[
(n− 1)τ``
]
τ`` = 1 +
1
2
τh` +
1
2
τh`.
(9)
Solving this, we get τh` = 3−
4
n+1
τ`` = 4− 4n+1
(10)
Inserting this into (7), we get τh = τ` = 4n/(n+ 1). Also note that ph = 1 and p` = 1/n. Let
us use these values to calculate the denominator of Equation (8). The sum in the denominator
becomes 4n. Noting that the average degree of the network is 2n/(n+ 1), the second term in
the denominator becomes 4n. we observe that the denominator of Equation(8) becomes zero.
This indicates that cooperation is not favored regardless of b/c.
26
B. Extended star graph
Consider an extended star graph, which is made by taking a star graph and then, to each leaf,
attaching one new node. So the resulting graph has one hub, n nodes with degree 2, and n leafs
with degree 1. An extended star graph with n = 10 is depicted in Figure SI.1. Let us denote each
leaf with `, and the hub by h, and degree-2 nodes with g (where g stands for ‘gate’). There are
distinct values for remeeting times: τhg, τh`, τ``′ (between two leafs), τgg′ (between two gates),
τg` (between a gate and the leafs attached to it), and τg`′ (between a gate and a leaf attached to
another gate).
ℓ
h
g
Fig. SI.1: An extended star graph with n = 10

τhg = 1 +
1
2n
[
(n− 1)τgg′
]
+ 1
4
[
τh`
]
τh` = 1 +
1
2n
[
(n− 1)τg`′ + τg`
]
+ 1
2
[
τhg
]
τ``′ = 1 +
2
2
[
τg`′
]
τgg′ = 1 +
2
4
[
τg`′ + τhg
]
τg` = 1 +
1
4
[
τh`
]
τg`′ = 1 +
1
4
[
τh` + τ``′
]
+ 1
2
[
τgg′
]
.
(11)
Solving this system and plugging the results into (7), we get
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
τh =
64n(3n− 1)
12n2 + 35n+ 1
τg =
8n(17n− 1)
12n2 + 35n+ 1
τ` =
16n(3 + 5n)
12n2 + 35n+ 1
(12)
It is also straightforward to see that ph = p` = 12 , and pg =
n+1
2n
. Inserting these values into
Equation (8), we get:
b∗ =
56n2 − 39n− 1
22n2 − 20n− 2 (13)
Which means that in the large n limit, b∗ approaches 28/11.
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C. Imperfect extended star graph
We consider the previous setup, but instead of attaching a new node to every node that is
adjacent to hub, we only do so for ng of them. So, the graph comprises a hub, ng nodes with
degree 2 that are connected to a hub and to a leaf node, and n− ng nodes with degree 1 that
are connected directly to the hub. An example graph with n = 10 and ng = 3 is depicted in
Figure SI.2. We denote the leafs connected to degree-2 nodes with d and we denote the leafs
directly connected to the hub by p. The quantities of interest are τpp′ (between two p nodes), τph,
τpg, τpd, τhg, τhd, τgg′ (between two g nodes), τgd (between a g node and its adjacent d-node),
τgd′ (between a g node and a d-node adjacent to another g node), τdd′ (between two d nodes
attached to the same g-node), and τdd′′ (between two d-nodes adjacent to two distinct g nodes).
The system of equations to solve for the remeeting times is the following:
ℓ
h
g
Fig. SI.2: An example imperfect extended star graph with n = 10 and ng = 3
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
τpp′ = 1 +
2
2
τph
τph + 1 +
1
2n
[
(n− ng − 1)τpp′ + ngτpg
]
τpg = 1 +
1
2
[
τhg +
1
4
[
τpd + τph
]
τpd = 1 +
1
2
τhd +
1
2
τpg
τhg = 1 +
1
2n
[
(ng − 1)τgg′ + (n− ng)τpg
]
+ 1
4
τhd
τhd = 1 +
1
2n
[
(ng − 1)τgd′ + τgd + (n− ng)τpd
]
+ 1
2
τhg
τgg′ = 1 +
1
2
[
τhg + τgd′
]
τgd′ = 1 +
1
4
[
τhd + τdd′
]
+ 1
2
τgg′
τgd = 1 +
1
4
τhd
τdd′ = 1 + τgd′ .
(14)

τh =
4
[
136n4 + 8n3(35ng + 29) + n
2(ng(152ng − 139) + 7) + 4nng
(
2ng(ng + 6)− 27
)
+ n2g(3ng − 11)
]
n
[
136n3 + 8n2(ng + 46) + n(129ng + 239) + ng(7ng + 18) + 7
]
τg =
2
[
428n3 + 3n2(97ng + 111) + n (92n
2
g + 90ng − 26) + ng
(
5ng(ng + 1)− 2
)]
136n3 + 8n2(ng + 46) + n(129ng + 239) + ng(7ng + 18) + 7
τd =
4
[
5(4n+ 1)n2g + (n(71n+ 74) + 10)ng + n
(
n(148n+ 205) + 74
)
+ n3g
]
136n3 + 8n2(ng + 46) + n(129ng + 239) + ng(7ng + 18) + 7
τp =
4
[
136n3 + 8n2(17ng + 29) + n
(
ng(68ng − 35) + 7
)
+ (ng − 1)ng(4ng + 1)
]
136n3 + 8n2(ng + 46) + n(129ng + 239) + ng(7ng + 18) + 7
(15)
Using these values, we arrive at
b∗ =
136n5 + n4(712ng + 96) + n
3(438n2g − 365ng − 225) + n2(56n3g + 108n2g − 325ng − 7) + n(2n4g + 9n3g − 20n2g − 7ng)
n4(356ng) + n3(185n2g − 269ng) + n2(−12n3g + 141n2g − 445ng) + n(−n4g − 41n3g + 106n2g − 28ng) + (11n3g − 3n4g)
(16)
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A more compact way to represent the result is with two matrices for the polynomial coefficients
of the numerator and the denominator. For the numerator, the i − j element of the following
matrix yields the coefficient of ni−1nj−1g in the numerator:
0 0 0 0 0
0 −7 −20 9 2
−7 −325 108 56 0
−225 −365 438 0 0
96 712 0 0 0
136 0 0 0 0

(17)
and for the denominator we have:
0 0 0 11 −3
0 −28 106 −41 −1
0 −445 141 −12 0
0 −269 185 0 0
0 356 0 0 0

(18)
For ng  n, we have:
b∗ =
34
89ng
n+
28539ng + 8845
15842ng
+O
(
1
n
)
≈ 0.38
ng
n+
(
1.80 +
0.56
ng
)
+O
(
1
n
)
. (19)
For example, if there is only one gate node, that is, ng = 1, we have
b∗
∣∣∣∣
ng=1
=
34
89
n+
18692
7921
+O
(
1
n
)
≈ 0.38n+ 2.36 + +O
(
1
n
)
. (20)
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D. Imperfect star of stars
Consider the previous setup, but instead of attaching one d-node to each g-node, we attach
nd of them to each g-node. So, the number of g-nodes is still ng, but the number of d-nodes is
now ng × nd.
An example graph with n = 10, ng = 3 , and nd = 20 is depicted in Figure SI.3. The
quantities of interest are τpp′ (between two p nodes), τph, τpg, τpd, τhg, τhd, τgg′ (between two g
nodes), τgd (between a g node and its adjacent d-node), τgd′ (between a g node and a d-node
adjacent to another g node), τdd′ (between two d nodes attached to the same g-node), and τdd′′
(between two d-nodes adjacent to two distinct g nodes). The system of equations to solve for
the remeeting times is the following:
p
h
g
d
Fig. SI.3: An example of imperfect star of stars, with n = 10, ng = 3 , and nd = 20
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
τpp′ = 1 +
2
2
τph
τph + 1 +
1
2n
[
(n− ng − 1)τpp′ + ngτpg
]
τpg = 1 +
1
2
[
τhg +
1
2(nd+1)
[
ndτpd + τph
]
τpd = 1 +
1
2
τhd +
1
2
τpg
τhg = 1 +
1
2n
[
(ng − 1)τgg′ + (n− ng)τpg
]
+ 1
2(nd+1)
ndτhd
τhd = 1 +
1
2n
[
(ng − 1)τgd′ + τgd + (n− ng)τpd
]
+ 1
2
τhg
τgg′ = 1 +
1
nd+1
[
τhg + ndτgd′
]
τgd′ = 1 +
1
2(nd+1)
[
τhd + ndτdd′′
]
+ 1
2
τgg′
τgd = 1 +
1
2(nd+1)
[
τhd + (nd − 1)τdd′
]
τdd′ = 1 + τgd
τdd′′ = 1 + τgd′
(21)
The expressions for the solution to this system are long, so we only present the final solution
after inserting into Equation (8). We have:
b∗ =
α
β
, (22)
where the numerator is given by:
α = n5
[
16n3d + 82n
2
d + 120nd + 54
]
+ n4
[
ng(112n
4
d + 460n
3
d + 600n
2
d + 252nd) + 16n
4
d + 74n
3
d + 92n
2
d + 22nd − 12
]
+ n3
[
n2g(48n
5
d + 256n
4
d + 390n
3
d + 182n
2
d) + ng(−32n5d − 138n4d − 256n3d − 227n2d − 77nd) +−16n4d − 90n3d − 171n2d − 135nd − 38
]
+ n2
[
n3g(22n
5
d + 56n
4
d + 34n
3
d) + n
2
g(28n
5
d + 80n
4
d + 80n
3
d + 28n
2
d) + ng(−16n5d − 108n4d − 238n3d − 217n2d − 71nd)− 3n2d − 7nd − 4
]
+ n
[
n4g(2n
5
d + 2n
4
d) + n
3
g(4n
5
d + 9n
4
d + 5n
3
d) + n
2
g(−2n5d − 11n4d − 18n3d − 9n2d) + ng(−3n3d − 7n2d − 4nd)
]
.
(23)
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β = n4
[
ng
(
64n4d + 256n
3
d + 296n
2
d + 96nd
) ]
+ n3
[
n2g
(
32n5d + 148n
4
d + 162n
3
d + 28n
2
d
)
+ ng
(−32n5d − 148n4d − 226n3d − 124n2d − 8nd) ]
+ n2
[
n3g (4n
5
d − 6n4d − 22n3d) + n2g (28n5d + 98n4d + 108n3d + 48n2d) + ng (−32n5d − 180n4d − 342n3d − 264n2d − 72nd)
]
+n
[
n4g (−2n4d) + n3g (−12n5d − 42n4d − 28n3d) + n2g (12n5d + 60n4d + 96n3d + 44n2d) + ng (−12n3d − 28n2d − 16nd)
]
+ n4g
(−2n5d − 4n4d)+ n3g (2n5d + 12n4d + 8n3d) (24)
Suppose there are many leafs but very few gates: ng  nd = µn, where µ is of O(1). That
is, n and nd are of the same order of magnitude and are both much greater than ng. We can use
the following expansion:
b∗ =
µ+ µ2ng(3ng − 2) + 7µng + 1
2µng(µ(ng − 1) + 2) +O
(ng
n
)
(25)
Maintaining the previous regime, we can expand this in ng as follows:
b∗ =
3
2
+
(
1
2
+
1
2µ
)
1
ng
+O
(
1
n2g
)
+O
(ng
n
)
. (26)
Since the average degree approaches 2 in the regime considered above, the graph is a significant
promoter of cooperation because b∗ (which approaches 3/2) is smaller than the average degree.
In the regime ng  n  nd, too, we find that b∗ is smaller than average degree. In this
regime, we have:
b∗ =
3
2
+
1
2(ng − 1) +O
(ng
n
)
+O
(
n
nd
)
(27)
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E. Star of stars
If we take the solution of the last section and set ng and n equal, the resulting graph is a star
of stars, that is, a hub that is connected to n nodes, and each of these n nodes is a hub to a star
of nd nodes. The critical benefit to cost ratio simplifies to the following:
b∗ =
n2
(
12n3d + 47n
2
d + 44nd + 9
)
− n
(
6n3d + 31n
2
d + 33nd + 8
)
− (nd + 1)
2nd(n− 1)
[
2 + n(3nd + 8)(nd + 1)
] (28)
For n nd, we can use the following expansion
b∗ =
(
2 +
1
n− 1
)
+
(
1
1− n +
1
2
)
1
nd
+O
(
1
n2d
)
. (29)
So b∗ approaches 2 + 1/(n− 1) as nd grows. The average degree, on the other hand, ap-
proaches 2 from above as nd grows. So b∗ never becomes smaller than the average degree.
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F. Three-layer extended star
Consider the extended star, but with three layers instead of two. There is one hub h, attached
to n nodes g in the first layer, there are n nodes G in the second layer each connected to one g
nodes, and there are n nodes ` in the third layer each attached to a G node. Figure SI.4 depicts
an example case with n = 10. The remeeting times of interest are: τ``′ (between two ` nodes),
τG` (between a G node and its adjacent ` node), τG′` (between a G node and an ` node not
adjacent to it), τg` (between a g node and an ` node on the same spoke), τg′` (between a g node
and an ` node on another spoke), τh` (between the hub and an ` node), τgG (between a g node
and its adjacent G node), τgg′ (between two distinct g nodes), τgh (between the hub and a g
node), τGG′ (between two distinct G nodes), τGg′ (between a G node and a g node on another
spoke), and τGh (between the hub and a g node).
ℓ
h
g
G
Fig. SI.4: An example three-layer extended star graph with n = 10
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
τ``′ = 1 + τG′`
τG` = 1 +
1
4
τg`
τG′` = 1 +
1
4
[
τ``′ + τg′`
]
+ 1
2
τGG′
τg` = 1 +
1
4
[
τh` + τG`
]
+ 1
2
τgG
τg′` = 1 +
1
4
[
τG′` + τh`
]
+ 1
2
τGg′
τh` = 1 +
1
2n
[
τg` + (n− 1)τg′`
]
+ 1
2
τGh
τgG = 1 +
1
4
[
τGh + τg`
]
τgg′ = 1 +
1
2
[
τGg′ + τgh
]
τgh = 1 +
1
2n
[
(n− 1)τgg′
]
+ 1
4
τGh
τGG′ = 1 +
1
2
[
τG′` + τGg′
]
τGg′ = 1 +
1
4
[
τg′` + τgg′ + τGG′ + τgG
]
τGh = 1 +
1
2n
[
τgG + (n− 1)τGg′
]
+ 1
4
[
τ`h + τgh
]
(30)
The solution leads us to the following result for the critical benefit-to-cost ratio:
b∗ =
106940n3 − 52194n2 − 4820n+ 6
41723n3 − 18453n2 − 10790n (31)
For large n, we can use the following expansion:
b∗ =
106940
41723
− 204326442
1740808729n
+O
(
1
n2
)
≈ 2.56− 0.12
n
+O
(
1
n2
)
(32)
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G. Two stars: hub-to-hub connection
If we have two star graphs, one with n1 leafs and the other with n2 leafs, we can connect these
two graphs in several different ways to restore the faith of cooperation (which is not favored by
natural selection in either of the star graphs alone, as shown in Section S2.A above).
First suppose that the hub of the first star is connected to the hub of the other via a link. There
are 8 distinct remeeting times to consider: τ`1`′1(between two distinct leafs of the first star), τ`1h1
(between a leaf and the hub of the first star), τ`1h2 (between a leaf of the first star and the hub
of the second star), τ`1`2 (between a leaf in one star and a leaf in the other), τh1h2 (between the
hubs), τh1`2 (between the hub of the first star and a leaf in the second star), τh2`2 (between a leaf
of the second star and its hub), and τ`2`′2 (between two leafs of the second star). The remeeting
times satisfy the following system of equations:

τ`1`′1 = 1 + τ`1h1
τ`1h1 = 1 +
1
2(n1+1)
[
τ`1h2 + (n1 − 1)τ`1`1′
]
τ`1h2 = 1 +
1
2
τh1h2 +
1
2(n2 + 1)
[
n2τ`1`2 + τ`1h1
]
τ`1`2 = 1 +
1
2
τh1`2 +
1
2
τ`1h2
τh1h2 = 1 +
1
2(n1 + 1)
[
n1τ`1h2
]
+
1
2(n2 + 1)
[
n2τh1`2
]
τh1`2 = 1 +
1
2(n1 + 1)
[
n1τ`1`2 + τh2`2
]
+
1
2
τh1h2
τh2`2 = 1 +
1
2(n2+1)
[
τh1`2 + (n2 − 1)τ`2`′2
]
τ`2`′2 = 1 + τh2`2 .
(33)
Solving this and inserting into Equation (7) and then plugging the results into Equation (8),
we arrive at the solution:
b∗ =
α
β
, (34)
38
where the numerator is
α = n51
(
8n32 + 41n
2
2 + 60n2 + 27
)
+ n41
(
64n42 + 307n
3
2 + 551n
2
2 + 437n2 + 129
)
+ n31
(
8n52 + 307n
4
2 + 1170n
3
2 + 1686n
2
2 + 1042n2 + 227
)
+ n21
(
41n52 + 551n
4
2 + 1686n
3
2 + 2066n
2
2 + 1065n2 + 175
)
+ n1
(
60n52 + 437n
4
2 + 1042n
3
2 + 1065n
2
2 + 450n2 + 50
)
+
(
27n52 + 129n
4
2 + 227n
3
2 + 175n
2
2 + 50n2
)
, (35)
and the denominator is
β = n41
(
32n42 + 128n
3
2 + 148n
2
2 + 48n2
)
+ n31
(
128n42 + 480n
3
2 + 544n
2
2 + 188n2
)
+ n21
(
148n42 + 544n
3
2 + 636n
2
2 + 240n2
)
+ n1
(
48n42 + 188n
3
2 + 240n
2
2 + 100n2
)
. (36)
If the two stars are identical, with n1 = n2 = n, then the expression simplifies to:
b∗ =
(n+ 1)2(10n2 + 17n+ 5)
4n4 + 12n3 + 11n2 + 5n
. (37)
When n is large, this converges to 10/4. With first-order correction in the large-n limit, we
can write
b∗ =
5
2
+
7
4n
+O
(
1
n2
)
. (38)
If the stars are not identical, but both are very large, such that n1 = n and n2 = αn, the in
the limit as n→∞, we have:
b∗ =
(
2 +
1
4α
+
α
4
)
+
(α + 1)(9α2 + 10α + 9)
32α2n
+O
(
1
n2
)
(39)
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H. Two stars: hub-to-leaf connection
I In the previous scenario, if instead of connecting the hubs, we connect the hub of the first
star to a leaf in the second star, the equations for the remeeting times change. We denote the
leaf that is connected to the hub of the first star by g. There are 12 distinct remeeting times to
consider: τ`1`′1 , τ`1h1 , τ`1h2 , τ`1`2 , τh1h2 , τh1`2 , τh2`2 , τ`2`′2 , τ`1g, τh1g, τgh2 , and τg`2 . Without loss
or generality, we consider the case where the second star has size n2 + 1. Equivalently, we can
assume the stars have sizes n1 and n2, and the hubs are being connected via one intermediary
node. This is merely for aesthetic reasons: with this change of notation, the analysis will be
manifest-symmetric in n1 and n2. The remeeting times satisfy the following system of equations:

τ`1`′1 = 1 + τ`1h1
τ`1h1 = 1 +
1
2(n1+1)
[
τ`1g + (n1 − 1)τ`1`1′
]
τ`1h2 = 1 +
1
2
τh1h2 +
1
2(n2 + 1)
[
n2τ`1`2 + τ`1g
]
τ`1`2 = 1 +
1
2
τh1`2 +
1
2
τ`1h2
τh1h2 = 1 +
1
2(n1 + 1)
[
n1τ`1h2 + τgh2
]
+
1
2(n2 + 1)
[
n2τh1`2 + τh1g
]
τh1`2 = 1 +
1
2(n1 + 1)
[
n1τ`1`2 + τg`2
]
+
1
2
τh1h2
τh2`2 = 1 +
1
2(n2+1)
[
τg`2 + (n2 − 1)τ`2`′2
]
τ`2`′2 = 1 + τh2`2
τ`1g = 1 +
1
2
τh1g +
1
4
[
τ`1h1 + τ`1h2
]
τh1g = 1 +
1
2(n1 + 1)
n1τ`1g +
1
4
τh1h2
τgh2 = 1 +
1
2(n2+1)
n2τg`2 +
1
4
τh1h2
τg`2 = 1 +
1
2
τgh2 +
1
4
[
τh1`2 + τh2`2
]
.
(40)
Solving this and using Equation (8), we arrive at
b∗ =
α
β
, (41)
40
where the numerator is
α = n61
(
288n42 + 1746n
3
2 + 3738n
2
2 + 3402n2 + 1122
)
n51
(
2880n52 + 19566n
4
2 + 53836n
3
2 + 74006n
2
2 + 50424n2 + 13568
)
+ n41
(
288n62 + 19566n
5
2 + 113908n
4
2 + 276152n
3
2 + 338086n
2
2 + 207330n2 + 50766
)
+ n31
(
1746n62 + 53836n
5
2 + 276152n
4
2 + 610544n
3
2 + 687478n
2
2 + 389244n2 + 88248
)
+ n21
(
3738n62 + 74006n
5
2 + 338086n
4
2 + 687478n
3
2 + 716764n
2
2 + 375760n2 + 78656
)
+ n1
(
3402n62 + 50424n
5
2 + 207330n
4
2 + 389244n
3
2 + 375760n
2
2 + 181328n2 + 34504
)
+
(
1122n62 + 13568n
5
2 + 50766n
4
2 + 88248n
3
2 + 78656n
2
2 + 34504n2 + 577
)
, (42)
and the denominator is
β = n51
(
1152n52 + 7200n
4
2 + 17472n
3
2 + 20778n
2
2 + 12285n2 + 2937
)
n41
(
7200n52 + 43072n
4
2 + 99734n
3
2 + 112892n
2
2 + 63433n2 + 14437
)
+ n31
(
17472n52 + 99734n
4
2 + 218830n
3
2 + 232766n
2
2 + 121788n2 + 25666
)
+ n21
(
20778n52 + 112892n
4
2 + 232766n
3
2 + 228350n
2
2 + 107262n2 + 19648
)
+ n1
(
12285n52 + 63433n
4
2 + 121788n
3
2 + 107262n
2
2 + 42048n2 + 5472
)
+ 2937n52 + 14437n
4
2 + 25666n
3
2 + 19648n
2
2 + 5472n2. (43)
If the stars are identical, that is, if we have two stars each with n leafs and then we connect
their hubs through a gate node, then we have
b∗ =
(n+ 1)(36n2 + 90n+ 19)
4n(3n2 + 11n+ 9)
= 3− 1
2n
+O
(
1
n2
)
(44)
So as the size of the stars goes to infinity, the value of b∗ approaches 3.
If the stars are not identical but both are large, with n1 = n and n2 = λn, then we have
b∗ =
(
5
2
+
1
4λ
+
λ
4
)
+
(λ+ 1)(λ+ 3)(3λ+ 1)
64λ2n
+O
(
1
n2
)
. (45)
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I. Ring of stars: a super-promoter of cooperation
Suppose there are L stars, each with n leafs. We situate these on a ring by connecting the
hubs. An example with n = 10 and L = 5 is illustrated in Figure SI.5. We define the following
remeeting times:
• τhh(x) is between the hubs of two stars which are x apart on the ring. For example, two
adjacent hubs have remeeting times τhh(1).
• τh`(x) is between a hub and a leaf of a star that is x apart. For example, for the hub and leaf
of the same star, we have τh`(0), and for the leaf of a star and the hub of the neighboring
star, we have τh`(1), and so on.
• τ``(x) is between two distinct leafs, belonging to two stars x apart. So τ``(0) is between
two leafs of the same star, τ``(1) is between a leaf in one star and a leaf in a neighboring
star.
Note that x varies between 0 and L.
ℓ
g
Fig. SI.5: An example case of ring of stars with n = 10 and L = 5
The recurrence relations that we need to solve have the form of three-dimensional difference
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equation:
for x = 2 . . . L− 2 :

τhh(x) = 1 +
1
n+2
[
τhh(x− 1) + τhh(x+ 1) + nτh`(x)
]
τh`(x) = 1 +
1
2(n+ 2)
[
nτ``(x) + τh`(x+ 1) + τh`(x− 1)
]
+
1
2
τhh(x)
τ``(x) = 1 + τh`(x)
for x < 2 :

τhh(1) = 1 +
1
n+2
[
τhh(2) + nτh`(1)
]
τh`(1) = 1 +
1
2(n+ 2)
[
nτ``(1) + τh`(2) + τh`(0)
]
+
1
2
τhh(1)
τh`(0) = 1 +
1
2(n+ 2)
[
(n− 1)τ``(0) + 2τh`(1)
]
τ``(0) = 1 + τh`(0)
.
(46)
This is a system of linear difference equations with constant coefficients. So the standard way
is inserting the ansatz in the form of rx and solving the resulting characteristic equation for r.
If there is no degenerate root, the solution will take the form
∑
i air
x
i , and we will have to add
this to a particular solution for the nonhomogenous system. We use the following ansatz:
τhh(x) = ξhhr
x
τh`(x) = ξh`r
x
τ``(x) = ξ``r
x
1 < x < L (47)
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This leads to the following characteristic equation:
(r − 1)2
[
r2 − 2(n+ 2)r + 1
]
= 0 =⇒

r1 = 0
r2 = 0
r3 = n+ 2 +
√
(n+ 1)(n+ 3)
r4 =
1
r3
. (48)
This has root zero with degeneracy two. This means that the particular solution to the nonho-
mogenous equation will be quadratic in x. For brevity of notation, let us define:λ
def
=
√
(n+ 1)(n+ 3),
R
def
= n+ 2 +
√
(n+ 1)(n+ 3).
(49)
Thus we plug in the following form for the solutions:
τhh(x) = Ahhx
2 +Bhhx+ Chh +Dhh
(
Rx +RL−x
)
τh`(x) = Ah`x
2 +Bh`x+ Ch` +Dh`
(
Rx +RL−x
)
τ``(x) = Ah`x
2 +Bh`x+ Ch` +Dh`
(
Rx +RL−x
) (50)
Plugging these into Equations (88), and setting the coefficients of different powers of x and
also those of Rx and R−x identical to zero (because the equations hold for every x and the
functions are linearly independent), and also using the requirement that τhh(x) must be equal to
τhh(L− x) (and same for τh` and τ``), we obtain:
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Ahh = A`` = Ah` = −(n+ 1),
Bhh = B`` = Bh` = (n+ 1)L,
Chh =
n(Ln+ L− 1) (RL + 1)
(n+ 1)RL + nλRL + 2λRL + n− nλ− 2λ+ 1 ,
Ch` =
2n4((L+1)RL+L−1)+2n3((λ+8)(RL−1)+L(λ+5)(RL+1))+n2(3L(2λ+5)(RL+1)+4(3λRL+12RL−3λ−11))+18λRL+31RL+n(25λRL+64RL+L(4λ+7)(RL+1)−21λ−48)−10λ−17
2n3λRL+14n2λRL+(n+1)(2n(n(n+8)+20)+31)RL+29nλRL+18λRL−2n4−14n3−2n3λ−36n2−10n2λ−41n−17nλ−10λ−17
Dhh = − n(Ln+ L− 1)
(n+ 1)RL + nλRL + 2λRL + n− nλ− 2λ+ 1
Dh` =
(n+ 2)(Ln+ L− 1)
(n+ 1)RL + nλRL + 2λRL + n− nλ− 2λ+ 1
τ``(0) =
2(L(4λ+2n(n+λ+4)+7)(n+1)2(RL+1)+(n+2)(7λ+2n(4λ+n(n+λ+6)+11)+12)(RL−1))
2n3λRL+14n2λRL+(n+1)(2n(n(n+8)+20)+31)RL+29nλRL+18λRL−2n4−14n3−2n3λ−36n2−10n2λ−41n−17nλ−10λ−17
τh`(0) =
−18λ+(10λ+n(17λ+2n(5λ+n(R+5)+18)+41))RL+17RL+2L(n+1)2(4λ+2n(λ+n+4)+7)(RL+1)−n(29λ+2n(7(λ+4)+n(λ+n+9))+71)−31
−10λ+(18λ+n(29λ+2n(7(λ+4)+n(λ+n+9))+71))RL+31RL−n(17λ+2n(5λ+n(λ+n+7)+18)+41)−17 .
(51)
Using these values, we arrive at the
b∗ =
α
β
, (52)
where the numerator is
α = (n+ 2)2
[
L(n+ 1)
(
− 2(n(2n+ 11) + 13)RL + (n(λ+ 2n+ 9) + 11)R2L + 2n2 − λn+ 9n+ 11
)
+ 2RL(n2(n+ 9) + 28n+ 26)−R2L
(
n2(n+ 9) + n(λ+ 24) + 22
)
− n3 − 9n2 + λn− 24n− 22
]
,
(53)
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and the denominator is:
β = 2
[
L(n+ 1)
(
− 2(n4 + 7n3 + 19n2 + 24n+ 13)(λ+ n+ 2)L
+
(
n4 + 7n3 + 17n2 + (λ+ 20)n+ 11
)
(λ+ n+ 2)2L + n4 + 7n3 + 17n2 − λn+ 20n+ 11
)
+ 2(n+ 2)(n4 + 9n3 + 30n2 + 44n+ 26)(λ+ n+ 2)L
−
(
n5 + 11n4 + 46n3 + 94n2 + (λ+ 98)n+ 44
)
(λ+ n+ 2)2L
− n5 − 11n4 − 46n3 − 94n2 + λn− 98n− 44
]
. (54)
For large n, we can expand the result in powers of 1/n. We have:
b∗ =
3L− 1
2L− 2 +
[
2L2 + L+ 3
2(L− 1)2
]
1
n
−
[
3L3 − 6L2 − 15L− 18
4(L− 1)3
]
1
n2
+O
(
1
n2
)
. (55)
So in the limit as n→∞, the critical benefit-to-cost ratio approaches 3L−1
2L−2 . If L is also large,
this approaches 3
2
. Note that the average degree is:
k =
L(n+ 2) + Ln
L+ Ln
= 2. (56)
This is particularly interesting because very rarely graphs have critical benefit to cost ratio less
than their average degree. A ring of stars does have this property. We call these structure ‘super-
promoters of cooperation’.
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S3. CLIQUES
A. Single clique (complete graph)
In a complete graph of size N , the system of equations (6) reduces to a single equation:
τxy = 1 +
1
2(N − 1)(N − 2)τxy +
1
2(N − 1)(N − 2)τxy. (57)
This yields τxy = N − 1. Thus from (7) we get τx = N . Plugging this into (8), we get
N(N − 1)(N − 2) in the numerator and −N(N − 2) in the denominator. Thus we arrive at:
b∗ave = −(N − 1) < 0. (58)
So regardless of b and c, natural selection does not favor cooperation on a clique.
B. Two cliques conjoined directly
Suppose we have a clique of size n1 and another clique of size n2, and we connect one node
from the first clique to a node in the second one. We denote these two nodes by g1 and g2. We
denote the non-gate nodes in the first clique by c1 and those in the second clique by c2. The
remeeting times we need to find are τc1,c′1 (between two commoners in the first clique) and τc2,c′2 ,
τg1,g2 (between the gates), τc1,g1 , τc2,g2 , τc1,g2 , τg1,c2 , and τc1,c2 . The recurrence relations are given
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by: 
τc1,c′1 = 1 +
τc1,c′1(n1 − 3) + τc1,g1
(n1 − 1) ,
τc1,g1 = 1 +
τc1,c′1(n1 − 2) + τc1,g2
2n1
+
τc1,g1(n1 − 2)
2(n1 − 1) ,
τc1,c2 = 1 +
τc1,c2(n2 − 2) + τc1,g2
2(n2 − 1) +
τc1,c2(n1 − 2) + τg1,c2
2(n1 − 1) ,
τc1,g2 = 1 +
τc1,c2(n2 − 1) + τc1,g1
2n2
+
τc1,g2(n1 − 2) + τg1,g2
2(n1 − 1) ,
τg1,c2 = 1 +
τc1,c2(n1 − 1) + τc2,g2
2n1
+
τg1,c2(n2 − 2) + τg1,g2
2(n2 − 1) ,
τg1,g2 = 1 +
τc1,g2(n1 − 1)
2n1
+
τg1,c2(n2 − 1)
2n2
,
τc2,c′2 = 1 +
τc2,c′2(n2 − 3) + τc2,g2
(n2 − 1) ,
τc2,g2 = 1 +
τc2,c′2(n2 − 2) + τg1,c2
2n2
+
τc2,g2(n2 − 2)
2(n2 − 1)
(59)
The closed-form of the solution is too long to present. For the case of n1 = n2 = n, we have
b∗ = n2 − 2n
3(n− 2)
n(n+ 1) (n3 + 2n− 1)− 2 . (60)
This can be expanded as
b∗ = n2 − 2
n
+
6
n2
+O
(
1
n3
)
(61)
(62)
This means that b∗ ≈ n2 is a good approximation even for moderate values of n.
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C. Two cliques, conjoined via one broker node
If instead of being connected directly, the gate nodes were connected via one intermediary
node, then we would have
b∗ =
8n9 − 10n8 + 37n7 − 32n6 + 34n5 − 76n4 + 81n3 − 26n2
20n7 − 42n6 + 104n5 − 100n4 − 100n3 + 222n2 − 116n+ 16 . (63)
This can be expanded for large n as follows
b∗ =
2
5
n2 +
17
50
n+
121
250
+O
(
1
n
)
. (64)
D. Two cliques conjoined via two intermediary broker nodes
For two identical cliques connected via a chain of two intermediary broker nodes, we can
take similar steps. Let τcc be the remeeting times between two commoners of the same clique,
τcg between a commoner and the gate node of the same clique, τcb between a commoner and the
broker node which is closer (that is, the broker which is connected to the gate node that belongs
to the same clique as the commoner), τcb′ between a commoner and the other broker node, τcg′
between a commoner and the gate node of the other clique, τcc′ between a commoner from one
clique and a commoner from the other clique, τgb between a gate node and the adjacent broker
node, τgb′ between a gate node and the non-adjacent broker node, τgg′ between the two gate
nodes, τbb′ between the two broker nodes. We also have kb = 2, kg = n, and kc = n − 1. We
have: 
τbb′ =
τgb′
kb
+ 1
τcc =
(n−3)τcc+τcg
kc
+ 1
τcc′ =
(n−2)τcc′+τcg′
kc
+ 1
τgg′ =
(n−1)τcg′+τgb′
kg
+ 1
τcg =
(n−2)τcg
2kc
+ (n−2)τcc+τcb
2kg
+ 1
τgb =
τgb′
2kb
+ (n−1)τcb
2kg
+ 1
τcb =
τcb′+τcg
2kb
+
(n−2)τcb+τgb
2kc
+ 1
τcb′ =
τcb+τcg′
2kb
+
(n−2)τcb′+τgb′
2kc
+ 1
τcg′ =
(n−2)τcg′+τgg′
2kc
+
(n−1)τcc′+τcb′
2kg
+ 1
τgb′ =
τgb+τgg′
2kb
+
(n−1)τcb′+τbb′
2kg
+ 1.
(65)
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The solution can be expanded for large n as follows:
b∗ = 4n− 224
5
+
42304
75n
+O
(
1
n2
)
(66)
E. Two cliques with longer chains
When the number of intermediary nodes on the connecting chain is comparable to the number
of nodes in the cliques, the analytical solutions to the system of linear equations for remeeting
times become unwieldy. But numerical solution is straightforward. Figure SI.6 displays the b∗
values for chains with 2 to 50 intermediary nodes, for different cliques sizes. For large L, the
values of b∗ approach 2, and the convergence rate depends on the cliques size. This limiting
value of 2 corresponds to an infinite chain (where the effect of the two cliques is also negligible).
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
2
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b*
number of intermediary nodes on the chain
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N=8
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N=10
Fig. SI.6: Conjoining two cliques with long chains.
F. Conjoining large cliques
We showed that conjoining two cliques directly or via one broker nodes leads to a b∗ that
grows with n quadratically. For a single clique, natural selection does not favor cooperation over
defection regardless of the benefit-to-cost ratio. Having two intermediary broker nodes does
provide a marked reduction in b∗, lowering the leading behavior of b∗ to linear in n, but we
note that for large network sizes, this still might not be feasible. That is, though cooperation is
in principle possible, for large cliques, the benefit-to-cot ratio proportional to n might still not
be feasible to provide, though it is considerably better than a single clique.
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G. Star of cliques
Suppose there are m identical cliques each with m nodes, and there is a hub node that is
connected to one gate node in each community. So there are m gate nodes overall, one for each
community. An example case with m = 5 and n = 10 is depicted in Figure SI.7.

τgh = 1 +
(m−1)τgg′
2m
+ (n−1)τhc
2n
τhc = 1 +
(m−1)τgc′+τgc
2m
+
(n−2)τhc+τgh
2(n−1)
τcc = 1 +
(n−3)τcc+τgc
n−1
τgc = 1 +
(n−2)τgc
2(n−1) +
(n−2)τcc+τhc
2n
τgg′ = 1 +
(n−1)τgc′+τgh
n
τcc′ = 1 +
(n−2)τcc′+τgc′
n−1
τgc′ = 1 +
(n−2)τgc′+τgg′
2(n−1) +
(n−1)τcc′+τhc
2n
.
(67)
h
g
c
Fig. SI.7: An example of star of cliques with n = 10 and m = 5.
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The solution is
τgh =
m2(2n−1)((n−1)n+1)((n−1)n+3)(n(n+3)−2)−m(2n7+n6−15n5+40n4−52n3+44n2−24n+6)+n((n−3)n+1)(n−1)3
m2(2n−1)(n(n+3)−2)+m(n(n(2n3+3n−7)+6)−2)+n(n−1)3 ,
τhc =
m2(n(n+3)−2)(2n5−4n4+10n3−8n2+5n−2)+m(−2n7+n6+7n5−21n4+24n3−23n2+16n−4)−(n−1)3n2(n+2)
m2(2n−1)(n(n+3)−2)+m(n(n(2n3+3n−7)+6)−2)+n(n−1)3 ,
τcc =
m(n−1)(m(2n5−4n4+12n3−5n2+3n−2)+(n−1)n(5n2+3)+2)
m2(2n−1)(n(n+3)−2)+m(n(n(2n3+3n−7)+6)−2)+n(n−1)3 ,
τgc =
(n−1)(m2(4n5−8n4+22n3−15n2+13n−6)+m(−2n5+10n4−13n3+13n2−12n+6)−(n−1)3n)
m2(2n−1)(n(n+3)−2)+m(n(n(2n3+3n−7)+6)−2)+n(n−1)3 ,
τgg′ =
m(m(n(n+3)−2)(2n6−4n5+10n4−8n3+3n2+3n−2)−(n−2)(n−1)3n2(3n+1))
n(m2(2n−1)(n(n+3)−2)+m(n(n(2n3+3n−7)+6)−2)+n(n−1)3) ,
τcc′ =
m(n(m(n(n+3)−2)(2n4−4n3+11n2−7n+2)+n5+10n4−22n3+14n2−7n+8)−4)
m2(2n−1)(n(n+3)−2)+m(n(n(2n3+3n−7)+6)−2)+n(n−1)3 ,
τgc′ =
m2(n(n+3)−2)(2n5−4n4+11n3−9n2+5n−1)−m(n5−11n4+14n3−10n2+10n−6)(n−1)−(n−1)4n
m2(2n−1)(n(n+3)−2)+m(n(n(2n3+3n−7)+6)−2)+n(n−1)3 ,
(68)
which gives
b∗(m,n) =
∑i=2,j=9
i=0,j=0 θijm
inj∑i=2,j=8
i=0,j=0 λijm
inj
, (69)
where the polynomial coefficients are given by matrices θ and λ:
θ =

0 0 2 −5 4 −2 2 −1 0 0
0 0 2 −9 22 −22 1 3 −5 0
0 0 −8 26 −31 20 −9 8 0 2
 ,
λ =

0 −4 18 −36 46 −42 24 −6 0
−8 32 −74 112 −99 55 −25 9 −4
8 −44 88 −72 13 9 −4 2 2
 . (70)
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For large n, we can expand the result as follows:
b∗ =
(
m
m− 2
)
n− (m+ 8)(m− 1)
(m− 2)2 +
[
14m4 + 11m3 − 14m2 − 50m+ 44
2m(m− 2)3
]
1
n
+O
(
1
n2
)
.
(71)
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H. Connecting two cliques via a star
If we have two cliques of size n and a star of size m (that is, m − 1 leafs and one hub),
we can connect the hub of the star to one gate node from each clique. An example case with
n = 20,m = 5 is depicted in Figure SI.8. We denote the hub of the star with h, its leafs with
`, the gate nodes with g, and the non-gate nodes within the cliques with c. The remeeting times
satisfy the following equations:
τcc = 1 +
1
n−1
[
(n− 3)τcc + τcg
]
τcc′ = 1 +
1
n−1
[
(n− 2)τcc′ + τcg′
]
τcg = 1 +
1
2(n−1)
[
(n− 2)τcg
]
+ 1
2n
[
(n− 2)τcc + τch
]
τcg′ = 1 +
1
2(n−1)
[
(n− 2)τcg′ + τgg′
]
+ 1
2n
[
(n− 1)τcc′ + τch
]
τch = 1 +
1
2(n−1)
[
(n− 2)τch + τgh
]
+ 1
2(m+1)
[
(n− 1)τc` + τcg + τcg′
]
τc` = 1 +
1
2(n−1)
[
(n− 2)τc` + τg`
]
+ 1
2
τch
τgg′ = 1 +
1
n
[
(n− 1)τcg′ + τgh
]
τgh = 1 +
1
2n
[
(n− 1)τch
]
+ 1
2(m+1)
[
(m− 1)τg` + τgg′
]
τg` = 1 +
1
2n
[
(n− 1)τc` + τh`
]
+ 1
2
τgh
τh` = 1 +
1
2(m+1)
[
(m− 2)τ`` + 2τg`
]
τ`` = 1 + τh`
(72)
ℓ
h
g
c
Fig. SI.8: An example case of connecting cliques via a star with n = 20 and L = 5
The solution that we obtain is
b∗ =
α
β
(73)
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α = (m+ 1)n
[
2m4n(6n2 − 4n+ 1)(n(n+ 3)− 2) +m3(18n8 + 36n7 + 4n6 − 87n5 + 144n4 − 131n3 + 100n2 − 48n+ 8)
+m2n(6n9 − n8 + 116n7 − 78n6 + 43n5 − 270n4 + 473n3 − 363n2 + 160n− 34)
+m(34n10 − 53n9 + 202n8 − 395n7 + 448n6 − 491n5 + 527n4 − 395n3 + 163n2 − 12n− 8)
+ 2(n− 1)2(20n8 − 11n7 + 30n6 − 25n5 + 47n4 − 42n3 + 39n2 − 16n)
]
(74)
β = −2(80m4 + 436m3 + 1069m2 + 1201m+ 428)n3 + 2(m− 1)(m+ 2)(3m+ 5)n10
+ (14m3 + 68m2 + 154m+ 174)n9 + (30m4 + 18m3 − 252m2 − 488m− 428)n8
+ (40m4 + 318m3 + 904m2 + 1000m+ 606)n7 − 4(41m4 + 188m3 + 330m2 + 278m+ 132)n6
+ 2(39m4 + 143m3 + 45m2 − 55m+ 48)n5 + 2(59m4 + 310m3 + 859m2 + 931m+ 261)n4
+ 4(20m4 + 132m3 + 329m2 + 395m+ 165)n2 − 8(2m4 + 20m3 + 53m2 + 67m+ 31)n
+ 16(m+ 1)(m(m+ 2) + 2) (75)
Note that with m = 1, which means that the star is only the hub with no leafs, so that the
cliques are being connected via a single node, we recover Equation (64). For 1 < m  n, we
can use the expansion:
b∗ =
(
(m+ 4)(m+ 1)
m2 +m− 2
)
n+
(m+ 1)(15m4 + 178m3 + 579m2 + 776m+ 452)
2(3m+ 5)(m2 +m− 2)2 +O
(
1
n
)
.
(76)
Note that in the main text, the number of leafs is denoted by m, whereas here the size of the
star is denoted by m. Thus, to recover the result of the main text one must simply replace m
with m+ 1 in the above equation.
For the simple case of m = 2, which means that the star is simply a dyad, and the cliques
are being connected via a bridging node with a leaf attached to it, we get:
b∗
∣∣∣∣
m=2
=
9n
2
− 51 + 27585
44n
+O
(
1
n2
)
.. (77)
In the special case of m = n, we have:
b∗ =
α
β
(78)
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where the numerator is:
α = n2(n+ 1)(6n11 + 51n10 + 139n9 + 38n8 − 267n7 + 84n6 + 127n5 − 62n4 + 57n3 − 135n2 + 130n− 40),
(79)
and the denominator is:
β = 6n13 + 60n12 + 124n11 + 36n10 − 94n9 − 344n8 + 44n7
+ 288n6 + 332n5 − 724n4 + 316n3 + 172n2 − 184n+ 32. (80)
For large n, we can use the following expansion:
b∗ = n− 1
2
+
16
n
+O
(
1
n2
)
. (81)
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I. Hierarchy of cliques
We can also connect communities in a hierarchical structure. We construct the hierarchical
network by connecting a base node (denoted by b) to q middle nodes (denoted by m), and
connecting each middle node to a gate node (denoted by g) of a clique of size n. So there are
q2 cliques. We denote the non-gate nodes within cliques by c (for ‘commoner’). An example
case with q = 3 and n = 5 is illustrated in Figure SI.9.
Fig. SI.9: An example case of hierarchical connection of cliques with q = 3 and n = 5.
The remeeting times of interest are τb,m (between the base node and a middle node), τb,g
(between the base node and a gate node), τb,c (between the base node and a commoner), τm,g
(between a middle node and a gate node adjacent to it), τm,g′ (between a middle node and a
gate node adjacent to another middle node), τm,c (between a middle node and a commoner of an
adjacent clique), τm,c′ (between a middle node and a commoner of a clique adjacent to another
middle node), τm,m′ (between two middle nodes), τc,g (between a commoner and a gate node
in the same community), τc,g′ (between a commoner and the gate node of another community,
the two communities being adjacent to the same middle node), τc,g′′ (between a commoner of a
community and the gate node of another community, the two communities being adjacent to two
distinct middle nodes), τc,c′ (between two commoners within the same community), τc,c′′ (between
a commoner in one community and a commoner in another community, the two communities
being adjacent to the same middle node), τc,c′′′ (between a commoner in one community and
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a commoner in another community, the two communities being adjacent to the distinct middle
nodes), τg,g′ (between two gate nodes adjacent to the same middle node), τg,g′′ (between two
gate nodes adjacent to two distinct middle nodes).

τb,m =
(q−1)τm,m′
2q
+
qτb,g
2(q+1)
+ 1
τb,g =
(q−1)τm,g′+τm,g
2q
+
(n−1)τb,c+τb,m
2n
+ 1
τb,c =
(q−1)τm,c′+τm,c
2q
+
(n−2)τb,c+τb,g
2(n−1) + 1
τm,g =
(n−1)τm,c
2n
+
(q−1)τg,g′+τb,g
2(q+1)
+ 1
τm,g′ =
(n−1)τm,c′+τm,m′
2n
+
qτg,g′′+τb,g
2(q+1)
+ 1
τm,c =
(n−2)τm,c+τm,g
2(n−1) +
(q−1)τc,g′+τb,c+τc,g
2(q+1)
+ 1
τm,c′ =
(n−2)τm,c′+τm,g′
2(n−1) +
qτc,g′′+τb,c
2(q+1)
+ 1
τm,m′ =
qτm,g′+τb,m
km + 1
τc,g =
(n−2)τc,g
2(n−1) +
(n−2)τc,c′+τm,c
2n
+ 1
τc,g′ =
(n−2)τc,g′+τg,g′
2(n−1) +
(n−1)τc,c′′+τm,c
2n
+ 1
τc,g′′ =
(n−2)τc,g′′+τg,g′′
2(n−1) +
(n−1)τc,c′′′+τm,c′
2n
+ 1
τg,g′ =
(n−1)τc,g′+τm,g
kg
+ 1
τg,g′′ =
(n−1)τc,g′′+τm,g′
kg
+ 1
τc,c′ =
(n−3)τc,c′+τc,g
kc
+ 1
τc,c′′ =
(n−2)τc,c′′+τc,g′
kc
+ 1
τc,c′′′ =
(n−2)τc,c′′′+τc,g′′
kc
+ 1.
(82)
Using these results we arrive at b∗. For the numerator, the For the numerator, the i−j element
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of the following matrix yields the coefficient of ni−1qj−1 in the numerator:
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −32 −80 48 192 32 −112 −48
0 0 16 224 412 −532 −1268 116 1064 416
0 32 12 −610 −930 2026 3558 −1488 −4272 −1592
0 −120 −168 871 982 −4400 −5652 5289 10158 3680
4 110 154 −540 410 6546 5245 −10821 −16333 −5815
−20 93 288 −86 −2494 −7219 −2896 13858 18330 6562
40 −160 −572 294 3689 6888 995 −12290 −14872 −5452
−40 −57 430 188 −3357 −5751 332 8622 9035 3398
20 170 −407 −911 1702 3253 −996 −4385 −3719 −1527
−4 −69 328 539 −695 −379 2282 2535 1281 566
0 −4 −197 −468 −713 −1400 −1666 −678 −144 −170
0 −3 26 160 602 1235 1204 518 176 98
0 0 −6 −61 −230 −349 −184 −2 −28 −36
0 0 0 0 6 26 54 70 52 16

, (83)
and for the denominator we have:
0 0 0 0 0 32 80 0 −80 −32
0 0 0 0 −48 −248 −280 400 768 272
0 0 0 −16 184 624 −200 −2612 −3124 −1032
0 0 32 68 −360 −586 2572 7482 7348 2364
0 0 −120 −62 456 −462 −5714 −11956 −11046 −3648
0 12 72 −234 −84 1501 4335 9459 10319 3892
0 −50 266 762 −684 −265 4176 872 −4844 −2833
0 62 −460 −665 1151 −2571 −12452 −10140 −981 1264
0 20 184 −421 −1095 4334 13630 11894 3627 −117
0 −120 96 1260 914 −3815 −9143 −7795 −2917 −216
0 118 −92 −1190 −1310 1128 3660 3406 1464 152
0 −50 −10 311 328 −207 −564 −562 −268 −2
0 8 22 97 272 293 136 80 24 −20
0 0 −24 −116 −190 −98 50 86 52 16

(84)
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For large n, we can use the following expansion:
b∗ =
[
q2 (2q2 + q + 1)
q2 (2q2 + q + 3)− 6q − 4
]
n
+
−16q11 − 60q10 − 152q9 − 307q8 − 689q7 − 1105q6 − 523q5 + 827q4 + 1226q3 + 619q2 + 136q + 12
(q + 1)2(4q + 3)
[
q (q (2q2 + q + 3)− 6)− 4
]2
+O
(
1
n
)
. (85)
For example, for q = 2, we have
b∗
∣∣∣∣
q=2
=
11
9
n
[
1 +O
(
1
n
)]
. (86)
For q = 3, we have
b∗
∣∣∣∣
q=3
=
99
97
n
[
1 +O
(
1
n
)]
. (87)
The prefactor in the asymptotic expression becomes 148/149 for q = 4, and 175/177 for
q = 5. As q grows further, the prefactor approaches unity from below.
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J. Ring of cliques
We assume L cliques, each with n nodes, situated on a ring via ‘gate’ nodes. Figure SI.10
shows an example of clique of rings with L = 5 and n = 10. We denote the gate nodes by g,
and other nodes by c (c stands for commoner). The remeeting times that we need to obtain are
τgg(x) (between two gate nodes separated by a distance x on the ring), τgc(x) (between a gate
node and a commoner in another community x apart), and τcc(x) (between a commoner from
one community and a commoner from another community x apart).
The recurrence relations are:
for x = 2 . . . L− 2 :

τgg(x) = 1 +
1
(n+1)
[
τgg(x− 1) + τgg(x+ 1) + (n− 1)τgc(x)
]
τcg(x) = 1 +
1
2(n+ 1)
[
(n− 1)τcc(x) + τcg(x+ 1) + τcg(x− 1)
]
+
1
2(n− 1)(n− 2)τcc(x)
τcc(x) = 1 +
1
n− 1
[
τcg(x) + (n− 2)τcc(x)
]
for x < 2 :

τgg(1) = 1 +
1
(n+ 1)
[
τgg(2) + (n− 1)τcg(1)
]
τcg(1) = 1 +
1
2(n+ 1)
[
(n− 1)τcc(1) + τcg(2) + τcg(0)
]
+
1
2(n− 1)
[
(n− 2)τcg(1) + τgg(1)
]
τcg(0) = 1 +
1
2(n+ 1)
[
(n− 2)τcc(0) + 2τcg(1)
]
+
1
2(n− 1)(n− 2)τcg(0)
τcc(0) = 1 +
1
n− 1
[
τcg(0) + (n− 3)τcc(0)
]
τcc(1) = 1 +
1
n− 1
[
τcg(1) + (n− 2)τcc(1)
]
.
(88)
This is a system of linear difference equations with constant coefficients. Plugging in the
ansatz rx + rL−x, we find that the characteristic equation for r is given by
(r − 1)2
[
(n− 1)r2 − n(n+ 1)r + (n− 1)
]
= 0. (89)
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Fig. SI.10: An example case of ring of cliques with n = 10 and L = 5
There are four roots: r = 0 has degeneracy 2, the third root is
R =
n2 + n+
√
[n(n− 1) + 2] [n(n+ 3)− 2]
2(n− 1) , (90)
and the fourth root is 1/R.
The double degeneracy of root zero means that the particular solution to the nonhomogenous
equation is quadratic in x. Thus we plug in the following form into the system of equations:

τgg(x) = Aggx
2 +Bggx+ Cgg +Dgg
(
Rx +RL−x
)
τcg(x) = Acgx
2 +Bcgx+ Ccg +Dcg
(
Rx +RL−x
)
τcc(x) = Accx
2 +Bccx+ Ccc +Dcc
(
Rx +RL−x
) (91)
For brevity of notation, we define:
ξ
def
=
√
[n(n− 1) + 2] [n(n+ 3)− 2] . (92)
Using this along with the value of R obtained above, we arrive at
62
Agg = Acc = Agc =
1
2
(−n2 + n− 2) ,
Bgg = Bcc = Bgc =
1
2
L((n− 1)n+ 2),
Dgg = − 2
L+1(n− 1)3 ((L− 1)n2 − Ln+ 2L+ n)
−2L+1nξ + 2nξ(2R)L + (n− 1)n((n− 1)n+ 2)(2R)L + 2L(n− 1)n((n− 1)n+ 2)− 2L+1ξ + 2ξ(2R)L
Dgc =
2L+1(n2−1)((L−1)n2−Ln+2L+n)
−2L+1nξ+2nξ(2R)L+(n−1)n((n−1)n+2)(2R)L+2L(n−1)n((n−1)n+2)−2L+1ξ+2ξ(2R)L
Dcc = (n− 1) +Dgc. (93)
The expressions for other variables are omitted for undue length. Using the solutions, we get
the critical benefit to cost ratio:
b∗ =
α
β
, (94)
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where the numerator is given by:
α = 22L+1LRL (n3 + n+ 2)
2
(n5 − 2n4 − 3n3 − 16n2 − 4n+ 8)(n8 + 4n7 + 2n6 + 4n5 + 11n4 − 8n3 + 8n2 − 8n+ 2)
+RL4LξL
(
2n17 + 2n16 − 12n15 − 36n14 − 140n13 − 220n12 − 488n11 − 776n10 − 678n9
− 1046n8 − 892n7 − 100n6 − 256n5 + 64n4 + 544n3 + 64n2 − 128n
)
+R2LL (n3 + n+ 2)
2
(
n13 + 6n12 + 19n11 + 48n10 + 69n9 + 74n8 + 43n7 + 116n6 − 46n5 − 84n4 + 34n3 − 80n2 + 72n− 16
)
+ξR2LL
(
n17 + 5n16 + 18n15 + 50n14 + 98n13 + 178n12 + 268n11 + 428n10 + 317n9 + 457n8 + 426n7 − 94n6 + 152n5 − 24n4 − 304n3 + 24n2 + 48n
)
+L4L (n3 + n+ 2)
2
(n13 − 2n12 − 21n11 + 24n10 + 93n9 − 14n8 + 195n7 + 108n6 − 70n5 + 12n4 − 78n3 − 48n2 + 72n− 16)
+ξL4L
(
n17 − 3 n16 − 28n15 + 26n14 + 18n13 + 18n12 + 300n11 + 236n10 + 349n9 + 673n8 + 362n7 + 234n6ξ + 168n5 − 72n4 − 240n3 − 88n2 + 80n
)
−RL4L+1(n+ 1)2(n8 − 4n7 + 10n6 − 24n5 − 15n4 − 28n3 − 12n2 − 8n+ 16)(n8 + 4n7 + 2n6 + 4n5 + 11n4 − 8n3 + 8n2 − 8n+ 2)
+RL4L+1ξ
(
− 2n16 − 2L+1n15 + 2L+2n14 − 2L+2n13 + 39 2L+2n12 + 123 2L+2n11 + 99 2L+3n10 + 143 2L+3n9
+ 611 2L+1n8 + 379 2L+1n7 + 53 2L+2n6 − 41 2L+2n5 − 23 2L+4n4 − 15 2L+4n3 + 2L+5n2 + 2L+6n
)
− 2(n+ 1)2R2L4L
(
n16 + 2n15 + 8n14 + 44n13 + 44n12 + 244n11 + 256n10 + 24n9
+ 969n8 − 782n7 + 760n6 − 468n5 − 254n4 + 280n3 − 216n2 + 144n− 32
)
+ 2ξR2L4L
(
− n16 − 3n15 − 12n14 − 50n13 − 106n12 − 306n11 − 508n10 − 500n9 − 605n8g − 343n7 + 92n6 + 78n5 + 176n4 + 116n3 − 60n2 − 16n
)
− 22L+1(n+ 1)2
(
n16 − 2n15 − 16n14 + 12n13 + 20n12 + 100n11 + 248n10 + 144n9
+ 609n8 − 154n7 + 568n6 − 556n5 + 226n4 − 200n3 − 88n2 + 144n− 32
)
+ 22L+1ξ
(
− n16 + n15 + 16n14 + 14n13 − 26n12 − 162n11 − 364n10 − 532n9
− 605n8 − 499n7 − 2006 + 46n5 + 128n4 + 156n3 + 28n2 − 48n
)
, (95)
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and the denominator is given by:
β = L22L+1RL[(n− 1)n+ 2]2(n6 + n5 − 7n4 − 33n3 − 46n2 − 4n+ 24)(n8 + 4n7 + 2n6 + 4n5 + 11n4 − 8n3 + 8n2 − 8n+ 2)
+ L4LRLξ
(
2n16 + 4n15 − 12n14 − 56n13 − 148n12 − 248n11 − 608n10 − 832n9 − 638n8 − 1228n7 − 868n6
+376n5 − 608n4 + 320n3 + 832n2 − 384n
)
+ L
(
((n− 1)n+ 2)2n14 + 9n13 + 39n12 + 109n11 + 207n10 + 269n9 + 131n8 + 105n7
+ 368n6 − 482n5 + 18n4 + 46n3 − 204n2 + 200n
)
+ Lξ4LR2L
(
− 48 + n16 + 6n15 + 22n14 + 56n13
+114n12 + 184n11 + 204n10 + 548n9 + 29n8 + 242n7 + 982n6 − 1516n5 + 1448n4 − 896n3 + 16n2 + 96n
)
+L4L((n− 1)n+ 2)2(n14 + n13 − 25n12 − 43n11 + 127n10 + 309n9 + 291n8 + 673n7 + 480n6 − 194n5
−46n4 − 434n3 − 12n2 + 200n− 48) + L4L
(
n16 − 2n15 − 18n14 + 16n13 + 58n12 − 16n11 + 340n10 + 508n9 + 69n8
+1378n7 − 74n6 + 772n5 − 296n4 + 384n3 − 848n2 + 288n
)
− 22L+2RL(n+ 1)(n9 − 3n8 + 2n7 − 22n6 − 3n5 − 31n4 − 160n3 + 24n2 + 16n+ 16)
(n8 + 4n7 + 2n6 + 4n5 + 11n4 − 8n3 + 8n2 − 8n+ 2) + 22L+1RLξ
(
− 2n16 − 2n15 + 12n14 + 44n13 + 180n12
+276n11 + 752n10 + 1712n9 + 1342n8 + 1150n7 + 1140n6 − 620n5 − 928n4 − 64n3 + 64n2 + 64n
)
+22L+1R2L(−n18 − 6n17 − 23n16 − 72n15 − 152n14 − 364n13 − 620n12 − 1124n11 − 1717n10 − 610n9 − 1947n8
−116n7 + 1166n6 + 276n5 + 702n4 − 480n3 − 64n+ 32) + ξ22L+1R2L
(
− n16 − 5n15 − 20n14 − 56n13
−116n12 − 268n11 − 398n10 − 822n9 − 855n8 − 211n7 − 662n6 + 574n5 + 332n4 + 36n3 − 72n2 − 16n
)
−22L+1(n+ 1)2(n16 − 4n15 − 14n14 + 56n13 − 26n12 − 80n11 + 726n10 − 176n9 + 135n8 + 1940n7 − 2072n6 + 2008n5
− 1566n4 + 352n3 − 96n2 + 128n− 32) + 22L+1ξ
(
− n16 + 3 n15 + 16n14 − 28n13 − 40n12 + 16n11
− 434n10 − 389 22L+1n9 − 475n8 − 1023n7 − 374n6 + 6n5 + 532n4 + 60n3 + 8n2 − 48n
)
.
(96)
For large n, this can be expanded to give:
b∗ =
(
L
L− 2
)
n− (L+ 1)
2 − 5
(L− 2)2 +O
(
1
n
)
(97)
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S4. THE RICH CLUB
What we call the rich club is a graph with extreme core-periphery structure. We consider a
clique of size Nc as the core graph, and Np peripheral nodes. Each peripheral nodes is connected
to every core node. Peripheral nodes are not connected to one another. So the degree of each
peripheral node is Nc, and the degree of each core node is Np + (Nc − 1).
It is easy to show that natural selection does not favor cooperation in a rich-club network
regardless of b/c.
This network comprises two sets of nodes: m hubs and N −m leafs. Each leaf is connected
to every hub, and to no other leaf. Each hub is connected to every node in the network. In other
words, there is a complete graph of m nodes as a super-hub, and all the N −m leaf nodes are
connected to the super-hub. Denoting the hub nodes by h and the leaf nodes by ell, we have
τcp = 1 +
1
2Nc
(Nc − 1)τcc + 1
2(Np +Nc − 1)
[
(m− 1)τcp + (n−m− 1)τpp
]
τpp = 1 +
1
Nc
(Ncτcp)
τcc = 1 +
1
(Np +Nc − 1)
[
(Nc − 2)τpp + (Np)τcp
] . (98)
Solving this system and finding b∗ is straightforward. Denoting the total number of nodes by
N , we have
b∗ =
N4c +N
3
c (6Np − 3) +N2c
[
3Np(4Np − 5) + 2
]
+NcNp
[
Np(8Np − 19) + 8
]
+Np
[
(7− 4Np)Np − 3
]
(Nc − 1)
[
Nc (N2c − 1)− 6N4 + (7Nc + 13)N3 − 2(Nc(Nc + 6) + 4)N2 + [Nc(Nc + 6) + 1]N
]
(99)
but can be simplified if we expand the solution for large N :
b∗ = − 2N
3
2m− 1
m− 1 +
1
18
[
8m+ 39 +
20
m− 1
]
+O(
1
N
). (100)
Consistent with the results discussed previously, this diverges for Nc = 1 (ordinary star),
because the fraction has a pole at Nc = 1. For any other combination of Nc and Np, we get a
negative value for b∗.
Now suppose we have two rich-club graphs, one with Nc core nodes and Np peripheral nodes,
the other with Mc core nodes and Mp peripheral nodes. Suppose we connect them by attaching
a core node from the first one and a core node in the second one. We denote these two nodes g,
denoting ‘gate’. The remeeting times to obtain are τp1,p′1 (between two peripheral nodes in the
firs graph), τp1,c1 (between a peripheral node in the first graph and a non-gate core node in the
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first graph), τp1,g1 (between a peripheral node in the first graph and the gate node of the first
graph), τp1,p2 (between a peripheral node in the first graph and a peripheral node in the second
graph), τp1,c2 (between a peripheral node in the first graph and a core node in the second graph),
τp1,g2 (between a peripheral node in the first graph and the gate node of the second graph),
τc1,c′1 (between two distinct core nodes in the first graph), τc1,g1 (between a non-gate core node
in the first graph and the gate node of the first graph), τc1,p2 (between a core node in the first
graph and the peripheral node in the second graph), τc1,c2 (between a non-gate core node in the
first graph and a non-gate core no in the second graph), τc1,g2 (between a non-gate core node
in the first graph and the gate node of the second graph), τg1,p2 (between the gate node of the
first graph and a peripheral node in the second graph), τg1,c2 (between the gate node of the first
graph and a non-gate core node of the second graph), τg1,g2 (between the two gate nodes), τp2,p′2
(between two distinct peripheral nodes in the second graph), τp2,c2 (between a peripheral node
in the second graph and a non-gate core node of the second graph), τp2,g2 (between a peripheral
node in the second graph and the gate node of the second graph), τc2,c′2 (between two distinct
core nodes in the second graph), and τc2,g2 (between a non-gate core node of the second graph
and the gate node of the second graph).
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
τp1,p′1 = 1 +
(Nc−1)τp1,c1+τp1,g1
Nc
τp1,c1 = 1 +
τc1,c1 (Nc−2)+τc1,g1
2Nc
+
(Nc−2)τp1,c1+(Np−1)τp1,p′1+τp1,g1
2(Nc+Np−1)
τp1,g1 = 1 +
τc1,g1 (Nc−1)
2Nc
+
(Nc−1)τp1,c1+(Np−1)τp1,p′1+τp1,g2
2(Nc+Np)
τp1,p2 = 1 +
τc1,p2 (Nc−1)+τg1,p2
2Nc
+
(Mc−1)τp1,c2+τp1,g2
2Mc
τp1,c2 = 1 +
τc1,c2 (Nc−1)+τg1,c2
2Nc
+
(Mc−2)τp1,c2+Mpτp1,p2+τp1,g2
2(Mc+Mp−1)
τp1,g2 = 1 +
τc1,g2 (Nc−1)+τg1,g2
2Nc
+
(Mc−1)τp1,c2+Mpτp1,p2+τp1,g1
2(Mc+Mp)
τc1,c1 = 1 +
τc1,c1 (Nc−3)+τc1,g1+Npτp1,c1
(Nc+Np−1)
τc1,g1 = 1 +
τc1,c1 (Nc−2)+τc1,g2+Npτp1,c1
2(Nc+Np)
+
τc1,g1 (Nc−2)+Npτp1,g1
2(Nc+Np−1)
τc1,p2 = 1 +
τc1,c2 (Mc−1)+τc1,g2
2Mc
+
τc1,p2 (Nc−2)+τg1,p2+Npτp1,p2
2(Nc+Np−1)
τc1,c2 = 1 +
τc1,c2 (Mc−2)+τc1,g2+τc1,p2Mp
2(Mc+Mp−1) +
τc1,c2 (Nc−2)+τg1,c2+Npτp1,c2
2(Nc+Np−1)
τc1,g2 = 1 +
τc1,c2 (Mc−1)+τc1,g1+τc1,p2Mp
2(Mc+Mp)
+
τc1,g2 (Nc−2)+τg1,g2+Npτp1,g2
2(Nc+Np−1)
τg1,p2 = 1 +
τc1,p2 (Nc−1)+Npτp1,p2+τp2,g2
2(Nc+Np)
+
τg1,c2 (Mc−1)+τg1,g2
2Mc
τg1,c2 = 1 +
τc1,c2 (Nc−1)+τc2,g2+Npτp1,c2
2(Nc+Np)
+
τg1,c2 (Mc−2)+τg1,g2+τg1,p2Mp
2(Mc+Mp−1)
τg1,g2 = 1 +
τc1,g2 (Nc−1)+Npτp1,g2
2(Nc+Np)
+
τg1,c2 (Mc−1)+τg1,p2Mp
2(Mc+Mp)
τp2,p2 = 1 +
(Mc−1)τp2,c2+τp2,g2
Mc
τp2,c2 = 1 +
τc2,c2 (Mc−2)+τc2,g2
2Mc
+
(Mc−2)τp2,c2+(Mp−1)τp2,p2+τp2,g2
2(Mc+Mp−1)
τp2,g2 = 1 +
τc2,g2 (Mc−1)
2Mc
+
τg1,p2+(Mc−1)τp2,c2+(Mp−1)τp2,p2
2(Mc+Mp)
τc2,c2 = 1 +
τc2,c2 (Mc−3)+τc2,g2+Mpτp2,c2
(Mc+Mp−1)
τc2,g2 = 1 +
τc2,c2 (Mc−2)+τg1,c2+Mpτp2,c2
2(Mc+Mp)
+
τc2,g2 (Mc−2)+Mpτp2,g2
2(Mc+Mp−1)
(101)
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The solution is too lengthy to be presentable. Here we only provide the solution for the
symmetric, case, where Mc = Nc and Mp = Np. We represent the result with two matrices for
the polynomial coefficients of the numerator and the denominator. For the numerator, the i− j
element of the following matrix yields the coefficient of N i−1c N
j−1
p in the numerator:
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 2 −16 56 −120 168 −144 64 −8 −2 0 0
0 0 8 −72 301 −787 1381 −1633 1333 −781 291 −23 −18 0
0 10 −128 678 −2173 4691 −7091 7915 −6610 3673 −1065 101 35 −36
4 −104 794 −3267 8744 −16460 23351 −25015 18364 −8491 2630 −365 −227 42
−32 478 −2826 9791 −23055 40724 −54479 50938 −32370 15367 −4575 −202 97 144
117 −1328 6625 −20310 45042 −75220 88791 −73754 46987 −19833 2605 −1178 1488 0
−263 2508 −11097 32195 −68445 102858 −110034 89955 −48986 12867 −8214 7048 0 0
408 −3451 14504 −41157 80804 −111968 116070 −79205 31370 −25611 20256 0 0 0
−467 3760 −15807 42730 −78636 104212 −88903 48954 −49318 39401 0 0 0 0
428 −3523 14610 −37634 65528 −70937 52755 −64719 54763 0 0 0 0 0
−347 2923 −11746 28386 −40277 40305 −60306 55941 0 0 0 0 0 0
260 −2158 8084 −15942 21847 −40481 42515 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−177 1363 −4184 8226 −19491 24035 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
103 −654 2046 −6575 9981 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−46 302 −1476 2959 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 −198 593 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−12 72 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(102)
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and for the denominator we have:
0 0 0 2 −14 42 −78 86 −42 −2 6 0 0 0
0 2 −6 −18 139 −394 601 −480 157 48 −83 34 0 0
4 −24 37 113 −679 1465 −1676 1124 −219 −517 497 −133 8 0
−24 96 −84 −440 1585 −2444 2615 −1344 −1671 2824 −1271 202 −68 24
61 −192 60 649 −1279 2275 −2102 −4112 9284 −5802 1667 −777 232 36
−85 212 −148 506 −396 −445 −7933 20009 −16177 6941 −3870 1050 336 0
68 −200 910 −2261 2311 −10934 29547 −29951 17426 −11333 3016 1417 0 0
−39 382 −1759 3078 −10174 30336 −38252 28858 −22014 6249 3563 0 0 0
52 −600 1825 −6229 21644 −34298 33086 −30151 9904 5933 0 0 0 0
−81 556 −2428 10561 −21645 26888 −30036 12202 6867 0 0 0 0 0
72 −554 3379 −9472 15549 −21997 11585 5635 0 0 0 0 0 0
−57 642 −2753 6289 −11758 8305 3277 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
55 −480 1696 −4464 4374 1323 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−38 274 −1138 1630 353 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
20 −174 405 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−12 60 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(103)
We can simplify the results in limiting cases. For large Np, we can use the following expan-
sion:
b∗ =
(
4Nc − 3
2
)
+
[
4N2c −
47Nc
4
− 1
4Nc
− 45
3Nc + 2
+
75
4
]
1
Np
+O
(
1
N2p
)
. (104)
In the limit as the number of peripheral nodes approaches infinity, the critical benefit to cost
ratio only depends on the number of core nodes.
For example, we put Nc = 1, we recover Equation (37), which pertains to two stars connected
via hubs. If we set Nc = 2, we get
b∗ =
13
2
+
11
2Np
+O
(
1
N2p
)
, (105)
that is, b∗ approaches 13/2 in the limit as Np →∞.
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S5. THE COMPLETE BIPARTITE GRAPH
A bipartite graph is one whose nodes can be divided into to disjoint subsets such that there
is no link within either of them, and every link in the graph connects a node to one of the
subsets to a node in the other. A complete bipartite graph is a bipartite graph in which each
node in the first subset is connected to every node in the other subset. A star graph is an example
of a complete bipartite graph with the first subset being a single node, and the second subset
comprising all the leafs.
Suppose we have two subsets, with sizes nx and ny. The remeeting times follow the following
relations: 
τxx = 1 + τxy
τyy = 1 + τxy
τxy = 1 +
1
2ny
[
(ny − 1)τyy
]
+ 1
2nx
[
(nx − 1)τxx
] (106)
The solution is
τx = τy =
4nxny
nx + ny
. (107)
It is straightforward to check that if we insert these values into (8), the denominator becomes
zero. An alternative approach is taken in Ref (19) of the main text.
Now suppose we have two identical complete bipartite graphs, each with nx and ny nodes
as above. We connect one x node of the first graph to one x node of the second graph. So the
degree of the two gate nodes are ny + 1. The degree of non-gate x nodes are ny, and the degree
of y nodes are nx. An example case with nx = 10 and ny = 5 is illustrated in Figure SI.11.
The remeeting times of interest are τx,x′ (between two non-gate x nodes of the same graph),
τx,x′′ (between a non-gate x node of one graph and a non-gate x node of the other graph), τy,y′
(between two y nodes of the same graph), τy,y′′ (between an y node of one graph and a y node
of other graph), τx,y (between a non-gate x node of a graph and a y node in the same graph),
τx,y′ (between a non-gate x node in one graph and a y node in the other graph), τg,x (between
the gate node of a graph and a non-gate x node of the same graph), τg,x′ (between the gate node
of a graph and a non-gate x node of the other graph), τg,y (between the gate node of a graph and
a non-gate y node of the same graph), τg,y′ (between the gate node of a graph and a non-gate
x node of the other graph), and τg,g′ (between the two gate nodes),
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Fig. SI.11: Connected complete bipartite graphs with nx = 10 and ny = 5

τx,x′ = 1 + τx,y
τx,x′′ = 1 + τx,y′
τy,y′ = 1 +
1
nx
[
(nx − 1)τx,y + τg,y
]
τy,y′′ = 1 +
1
nx
[
(nx − 1)τx,y′ + τg,y′
]
τx,y = 1 +
1
2ny
[
(ny − 1)τy,y′
]
+ 1
2nx
[
(nx − 2)τx,x′ + τg,x
]
τx,y′ = 1 +
1
2
τy,y′′ +
1
2
[
(nx − 1)τx,x′′ + τg,x′
]
τg,x = 1 +
1
2
τg,y +
1
2(ny+1)
[
nyτx,y + τg,x′
]
τg,x′ = 1 +
1
2(ny+1)
[
nyτx,y′ + τg,x
]
+ 1
2
τg,y′
τg,y = 1 +
1
2nx
[
(nx − 1)τg,x
]
+ 1
2(ny+1)
[
(ny − 1)τy,y′ + τg,y′
]
τg,y′ = 1 +
1
2(ny+1)
[
nyτy,y′′ + τg,y
]
+ 1
2nx
[
(nx − 1)τg,x′ + τg,g′
]
τg,g′ = 1 +
1
ny+1
[
nyτg,y′
]
(108)
The result is
b∗ =
α
β
, (109)
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where the numerator is given by
α = n1(n2 + 1)
2
[
2n41n2(n2 + 1)(3n2 + 2)(3n2 + 4)(8n2 − 1)
+ n31n2(42n
4
2 + 474n
3
2 + 945n
2
2 + 623n2 + 126)
− n21(36n52 + 235n42 + 263n32 + 24n22 − 24n2 + 12)
− n1(3n2 + 2)(6n32 + 43n22 + 25n2 − 6)− 2(n22 + 9n2 + 6)
]
, (110)
and the denominator is given by
β = 4n51n2(n2 + 1)(3n2 + 2)(3n2 + 4)(n2(n2 + 2) + 2)
+ 2n41(18n
7
2 + 102n
6
2 + 274n
5
2 + 435n
4
2 + 429n
3
2 + 316n
2
2 + 204n2 + 64)
+ n31(24n2
7 + 84n26 + 20n25 − 155n24 − 240n23 − 467n22 − 538n2− 192)
+ n21(8n
6
2 − 89n52 − 531n42 − 848n32 − 412n22 + 56n2 + 60)
+ n1(34n
5
2 + 127n
4
2 + 138n
3
2 + 39n
2
2 + 2n2 + 4)
+ 2n2(n2 + 1)(3n2(n2 + 3) + 4) (111)
For nx  ny, we can use the following expansion
b∗ = 4nx − 3
2
+
(
14− 1
4nx
+ nx − 4n2x −
45
3nx + 2
)
1
ny
+O
(
1
n2y
)
. (112)
Note that for nx = 1, we get the case of two stars connected via hubs, for which we showed
that b∗ approaches 5/2, as this new result reaffirms.
On the other hand, if we set ny = ny = n, we get
b∗
∣∣∣∣
nx=ny=n
= 2n− 1 + 3
n
+O
(
1
n2
)
(113)
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S6. CONJOINING SCALE-FREE NETWORKS
In the main text, Fig. 5, we presented the results for conjoining two ER networks, as well as
two KE scale-free networks. In Figure SI.12, we present the same results of Fig. 5a of the main
text (which pertained to conjoining of ER networks) but with 1/b∗ instead of b∗. In Figure SI.13,
we represent the results of Fig. 5c of the main text (which pertained to the conjoining of KE
networks).
In this section, we present results for the same conjoining procedure applied to three additional
scale-free network models that produce networks with heavy-tailed degree distributions that
exhibit structural properties that actual social networks possess. The first model is the model
of Holme and Kim [2] (HK), which produce networks with power-law degree distribution and
high clustering. The second model is the Forest Fire (FF) model of Leskovec et al. [3], which in
addition to the above properties, exhibits densification. The third model is Barthe´lemy’s spatial
scale-free model (SSF) which combines preferential attachment with distance selection [4]. The
fourth model is preferential attachment (PA) with initial attractiveness [5]. For the first thee
models, we generate five networks of size 100 whose b∗ values equaled -1000, -500, -250, 250,
500, 1000 (within a 5% error margin). For the preferential attachment model, the generated
graphs have typically better b∗ values and it we did not find an instance with negative b∗. The
b∗ values of the two graphs under the PA model were 50, 100, 150, 200, and 250.
Then, for each pair of possible networks, we calculated the median b∗ of the composite network
which results from creating a link between a node chosen from the first network and another
chosen from the second network. We calculated the median value of all these b∗ values, and
assigned it to that pair of networks. We repeated the same procedure for interconnections via
one intermediary broker node as well. Figure SI.14 presents the results. Figure SI.15 presents
the results using 1/b∗ instead of b∗. In all cases, the b∗ of the composite network is better than
those of the individual networks, and conjoining via one intermediary broker node is better than
direct interconnection without an intermediary node.
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Fig. SI.12: Conjoining two ER networks, the results being the same as those in Fig. 5a of the main text, but here we use 1/b∗
to characterize the merit for cooperation instead of b∗.
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Fig. SI.13: Conjoining two KE networks, the results being the same as those in Fig. 5c of the main text, but here we use 1/b∗
to characterize the merit for cooperation instead of b∗.
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Fig. SI.14: Conjoining two scale-free networks. (a) The model of Holme and Kim, (b) The Forest-Fire model of Leskovec et
al., (c) The Spatial Sale-free model of Barthelemy. (d) Preferential attachment model with initial attractiveness. In all cases, the
blue numbers (upper triangle) represent the median b∗ value for interconnection of the two networks via an intermediary broker
nodes, and the orange numbers (lower triangle) pertain to direct interconnections.
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Fig. SI.15: Same results as in Figure SI.14, but using 1/b∗ instead of b∗.
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S7. COMMUNITY STRUCTURE
We found in this paper that dense communities promote spite, and connecting them promotes
cooperation. We demonstrated that connections with intermediary broker nodes are better at
constructing composite networks that promote cooperation as compared to direct interconnections
with no intermediary nodes.
Since sparsely interconnected cohesive groups is closely related to the notion of community
structure in the network science literature, here we focus on two standard frameworks for produc-
ing networks with community structure: LFR benchmarks [6], and Stochastic Block Models [7].
Employing these two frameworks, in this section we investigate the role of community structure
on the evolution of cooperation.
For the LFR benchmark, we used the publicly-available code that the authors of Ref. [6] have
provided:
https://sites.google.com/site/santofortunato/inthepress2
We generated 105 networks. For every input parameter, we selected a value from the possible
range uniformly at random, and let the algorithm decide whether a network can be constructed
from the given set of parameters. The network size is N = 100. The mixing parameter was
chosen uniformly at random in [0, 1], the maximum degree kmax was chosen uniformly from
the set of integers in the (1, N ] interval, the average degree was chosen uniformly from the set
of integers in the (1, kmax] interval, the degree exponent was uniformly chosen from the [0, 3]
interval, the exponent for the community size distribution was chosen uniformly in the [0, 1]
interval. We use network modularity [8] to quantify how strongly networks are divided into
communities. Stronger division into communities pertains to higher values of modularity.
Fig. 6a shows the mean value of 1/b∗ for different values of modularity. We plotted 1/b∗ instead
of b∗ merely because the patterns were visually better discernible. As modularity increases, b∗
decreases. The number of communities also affects b∗. For fixed size and given modularity,
greater number of communities leads to less b∗, hence more conduciveness to the evolution of
cooperation.
Stochastic Block Models (SBM) is another standard modeling framework for generating
networks with community structure and also for inferring community structure [7]. This model
simply involves two parameters: Pwithin (the within-community link probability) and Pbetween
(the between-community link probability). For fixed network size N = 100, we generated 106
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Fig. SI.16: The effect of community structure on the evolution of cooperation for LFR benchmark graphs. Each marker
represents the average value of data points falling in the corresponding bin of for modularity.
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Fig. SI.17: The effect of community structure on the evolution of cooperation for SBM benchmark graphs. Each marker
represents the average value of data points falling in the corresponding bin of for modularity.
networks. Both Pwithin and Pbetween are selected uniformly at random from the interval [0, 1].
Figure SI.17 depicts 1/b∗ in terms of modularity. Consistent with the above results, higher
modularity leads to lower values of b∗. Similar to the case of LFR, we plotted 1/b∗ instead of
b∗ simply because the patterns were visually better discernible
The second experiment on SBMs that we report is to investigate how b∗ depends on Pwithin and
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Fig. SI.18: Results for SBM networks. When the communities have small within-community density, b∗ grows slowly by
adding between-community links, as compared to dense communities. Moreover, the greater the number of communities are,
this increase with between-community link density becomes steeper: For Pwithin = 0.3, the curve pertaining to four communities
has the highest b∗, but for Pwithin = 0.7, the trend is reversed and the curve for two communities has the highest b∗ and the
steepest increase with Pbetween.
Pbetween . For the range Pwithin ∈ [0.3, 0.7] and Pbetween ∈ (0, 0.15], we plotted the expected value
of b∗ averaged over 104 realizations. We consider the cases of two, three, and four communities,
each with size 100. The results are depicted in Figure SI.18. We find that for dense communities
(which, as shown previously, support spite individually), sparse interconnections correspond to
lower values of b∗. The results demonstrate that adding too many interconnections between the
communities are not beneficial.
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S8. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
The above-considered topologies were ideal types amenable to exact analytical treatment.
More realistic scenarios of course involve more randomness. We test if the above-considered
topologies still produce reasonably-low values of b∗ in presence of noise. That is, do topologies
close to those we considered possess fairly similar values of b∗ as we calculated? or do a small
amount of structural noise vary the results markedly?
For fair comparison, we retain the number of links (so that density would be intact), and rewire
each link with probability p, and then calculate the ratio of the b∗ of the rewired network to that
of the original network. Since there are many ways to perform the rewiring, we consider the
median value of the said ratio for given rewiring probability. Figure SI.19 presents the median
ratio of b∗ to that of the original network as a function of the rewiring probability p for the
topologies considered above. In all cases, the distribution of this ratio is fairly close to unity.
This demonstrates that in the presence noise, the noisy networks still exhibit the cooperative
merit of the original composite networks.
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Fig. SI.19: The robustness of the presented b∗ values for the structures discussed, as a function of the rewiring probability
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L=0
L=1
L=2
Fig. SI.20: Simulation results for conjoining two stars, each with 50 leaves. Hubs are connected via zero, one, and two
intermediary nodes.
S9. SIMULATION RESULTS
In addition to the robustness checks performed above, we also present simulation results for
confirming the accuracy of the reported results for different topologies. Figure SI.20 presents
the results for conjoining two stars each with 50 leaves, whose hubs are connected via a chain
of zero, one, or two intermediary nodes (three cases depicted together). The vertical axis is the
fixation probability times network size N . The dashed vertical purple line marks the theoretical
prediction, that is, the value of b∗ at which the value of fixation probability times N equals
one. The markers represent simulation results for different values of b. The simulation results
closely agree with the theoretical predictions. Figure SI.21 depicts the results for imperfect star
of stars, Figure SI.22 for star of stars, and Figure SI.23 for ring of stars. Figure SI.24 depicts
the results for the star of cliques, Figure SI.25 for conjoining to cliques via a star as described
in Section S3.H, Figure SI.26 for ring of cliques, and Figure SI.33 for hierarchy of cliques as
discussed in Section S3.I. Finally, Figure SI.28 presents the results for conjoining two rich clubs
and Figure SI.29 pertains to the conjoining of two complete bipartite graphs. In all cases, the
selection strengths for simulations is 0.01. The results are calculated over 106 Monte Carlo trials.
That is, for each network, we run 106 trials in which we take a network in which every node is
a defector, we select one node uniformly at random, we make it a cooperator, and initiate the
dynamics according to the game and update mechanisms described in the paper. The fraction of
trials that terminate in an all-C state is the fixation probability. The value of c is set to 1 and
the test values of b are 0.9, 0.95, 1, 1.05, and 1.1 of the theoretically-predicted b∗, so that the
crossover can be visually observed from the figure with convenience.
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Fig. SI.21: Simulation results for the imperfect star of stars: for a star graph with 15 leaves, we select five leaf nodes and to
each of them connect 10 new leaf nodes. The theoretical prediction is b∗ ≈ 2.15.
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Fig. SI.22: Simulation results for star of stars: We start from a star graph with 5 leaves, and to each leaf node we attach 5
new nodes. The theoretical prediction is b∗ ≈ 2.32.
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Fig. SI.23: Simulation results for the ring of five stars, each with 20 leaf nodes. The theoretical prediction is b∗ ≈ 1.84. It is
notable that the average degree is 2, and b∗ < 2. This is one of the superpromoter graphs discussed in the text.
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Fig. SI.24: Simulation results for the star of cliques: four cliques, each of size 10, connected to a single broker node. The
theoretical prediction is b∗ ≈ 19.56
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Fig. SI.25: Simulation results for the conjoining of two cliques via a star graph. Two cliques of size 10, connected via a broker
node, with four leaf nodes connected to the broker node. The theoretical prediction is b∗ ≈ 13.21.
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Fig. SI.26: Simulation results for the ring of cliques: four cliques, each with size 20. The theoretical prediction is b∗ ≈ 35.90.
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Fig. SI.27: Simulation results for hierarchy of cliques, identical to the graph illustrated in Figure SI.9. The theoretical prediction
is b∗ ≈ 4.80.
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Fig. SI.28: Simulation results for conjoining two rich clubs, each with 50 peripheral nodes and 5 core nodes. The theoretical
prediction is b∗ ≈ 19.66.
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Fig. SI.29: Simulation results for conjoining two complete bipartite graphs, each consisting of two sets of 10 nodes. The
theoretical prediction is b∗ ≈ 19.29.
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S10. IMITATION UPDATING
In addition to the DB updating considered in the main text, here we also provide the solution
for imitation (IM) updating, in which each node also has the option of not updating its strategy
at all (equivalently, copies its own strategy).
DB and IM updating can both be considered special cases of a general process, which we
now describe. The population structure is defined by two sets of probabilities: the replacement
probability pxy and the interaction probability p˜xy. At each time-step, each individual x interacts
with other individuals y with probability (or frequency) p˜xy, receiving an expected payoff of
fx. This payoff is rescaled to Fx = 1 + δfx, where δ > 0 represents the strength of selection.
Then, an individual is chosen, uniformly at random, to update its strategy. The probability that
individual x imitates individual y is proportional to pxyFy.
For DB updating on an unweighted, undirected graph, the replacement and interaction prob-
abilities are the same:
pxy = p˜xy =

1
kx
y ∈ Nx
0 otherwise
(114)
For IM updating, the interaction probabilities p˜xy are again given by Eq. (114), but the replace-
ment probabilities are instead given by
pxy =

1
kx+1
if y = x or y ∈ Nx
0 otherwise
(115)
This reflects the fact that in IM updating, an individual can “imitate” itself (i.e. choose not to
change its strategy).
We now provide a general derivation, valid for both DB and IM updating, of the conditions
for cooperation to be favored under weak selection. More explicit details can be found in [1].
We represent the population state by a binary vector s = (s1, . . . , sN), where sx = 1 if x is a
(C)ooperator and sx = 0 if vertex x is a (D)efector. For the donation game

C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
, (116)
the payoff to vertex x can be expressed as
fx(s) = −csx + b
∑
y
p˜xysy. (117)
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We require some notation for random walks. Consider a random walk starting at vertex x
that takes m steps according to the replacement probabilities p, followed by n steps according
to interaction probabilities p˜. We denote by p(m,n)xy the probability that such a walk terminates
at vertex y. We let pix denote the stationary probability of vertex x for random walks using the
replacement probabilities p. These stationary probabilities are given by
pix =

kx∑
y ky
DB updating
kx + 1∑
y(ky + 1)
IM updating
(118)
The stationary probability pix can also be understood as the reproductive value (RV) of vertex x
[9]. Since random walks on undirected graphs are reversible (e.g. [10]), we have the reversibility
property pixpxy = piypyx, and more generally, pixp
(m,0)
xy = piyp
(m,0)
yx , valid for all vertices x, y and
all m ≥ 0.
We study selection using the RV-weighted frequency sˆ =
∑
x pixsx. We denote expected
change in sˆ over a single time-step by D(s), which can be calculated as
D(s) =
1
N
∑
x
sx
(
−pix +
∑
y
piy
Fx(s)pyx∑
z Fz(s)pyz
)
=
1
N
∑
x
sx
(
−pix +
∑
y
piy
(
pyx + δ
(
fx(s)pyx −
∑
z
fz(s)pyz
)))
+O(δ2)
=
δ
N
∑
x
pixsx
(
f (0,0)x (s)− f (2,0)x (s)
)
+O(δ2)
=
δ
N
∑
x
pixsx
(−c (s(0,0)x − s(2,0)x )+ b (s(0,1)x − s(2,1)x ))+O(δ2).
Above, we have made use of the reversibility property piypyx = pixpxy and we have introduced
the notation
f (n,m)x =
∑
y
p(n,m)xy fy, s
(n,m)
x =
∑
y
p(n,m)xy sy.
We define D′(s) to be the δ-derivative of D(s) at δ = 0:
D′(s) =
1
N
∑
x
pixsx
(−c (s(0,0)x − s(2,0)x )+ b (s(0,1)x − s(2,1)x )) . (119)
[11] showed that the fixation probability of cooperators under weak selection can be expressed
as
ρC =
1
N
+ δ〈D′〉+O(δ2), (120)
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where 〈 〉 denotes an expectation over states arising under neutral drift, from an initial state with
a single cooperator placed at a uniformly chosen random vertex. It follows that cooperation is
favored under weak selection if and only if 〈D′〉 > 0.
We can calculate 〈D′〉 using the method of coalescing random walks [11]–[14]. Consider a
process involving two random walkers, initially located at vertices x and y. At each time-step,
one of the two walkers is chosen to take a step, using the step probabilities for replacement. The
coalescence time τxy is defined as the expected time to until the two walkers meet. Coalescence
times satisfy the recurrence relation
τxy = τyx = (1− δxy)
[
1 +
∑
z
(pxzτzy + pyzτxz)
]
(121)
Duality between CRW’s and the voter model [12], [14] implies that τxy is proportional to
the expected time since x and y diverged from their most recent common ancestor. Using this
duality, [1] obtain the identity
〈sxsy − szsw〉 = τzw − τxy
2
. (122)
We introduce the notation
τ (n,m) =
∑
x,y
pixp
(n,m)
xy τxy. (123)
Then substituting Eqs. (119) and (122) into Eq. (120) we obtain the fixation probability of
cooperation:
ρC =
1
N
+
δ
2N
(
− cτ (2,0) + b (τ (2,1) − τ (0,1)) )+O(δ2).
Cooperation is therefore favored under weak selection if and only if
−cτ (2,0) + b (τ (2,1) − τ (0,1)) > 0.
[1] show that this condition implies both ρC > 1/N and ρD < 1/N under weak selection. The
critical benefit-cost ratio is given by
b∗ =
τ (2,0)
τ (2,1) − τ (0,1) . (124)
For DB updating (which we considered so far), since the replacement and interaction proba-
bilities coincide, we can write the critical benefit-cost ratio more simply as
b∗ =
τ (2)
τ (3) − τ (1) , (125)
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Fig. SI.30: IM updating for conjoining cliques
where τ (n) =
∑
x pixp
(n)
xy τxy. Eq. (121) leads to a recurrence for τ (n):
τ (n+1) = τ (n) +
∑
x
pixp
(n)
xx τx − 1, (126)
where τx = 1 +
∑
y pxyτxy is the remeeting time for two random walks from x. In particular
(assuming the graph has no self-loops), we have
τ (0) = 0 (127a)
τ (1) =
∑
x
pixτx − 1 (127b)
τ (2) =
∑
x
pixτx − 2 (127c)
τ (3) =
∑
x
pixτx (1 + px)− 3. (127d)
Above, px = p
(2)
xx is the probability that a two-step random walk from x returns to x. Using
Eq. (127), we can rewrite the critical benefit-cost ratio in Eq. (128) as
b∗ =
∑
x pixτx − 2∑
x pixτxpx − 2
=
∑
x kxτx − 2Nk¯∑
x kxτxpx − 2Nk¯
(128)
In the case of IM updating, substituting from Eqs. (115), (118), and (123) into Eq. (124) gives
the critical benefit-cost ratio for IM:
b∗ =
∑
x,y,z(kx + 1)pxypyzτxz∑
x,y,z,w(kx + 1)pxypyzp˜zwτxw −
∑
x,y(kx + 1)pxyτxy
.
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Fig. SI.31: IM updating for conjoining stars
Fig. SI.32: IM updating for conjoining complete bipartite networks
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Fig. SI.33: IM updating for conjoining rich clubs
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S11. SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
The summary of the results for the real social network data sets (as discussed in main text) is
presented in Table SI.1. For the high school network, division to both two and three communities
returned reasonable groupings, so we reported results for both.
TABLE SI.1: results for real social network data sets
Network N m bc BC
fourth grade 24 2 -11,-39 41
fifth grade 22 2 -23,-47 19
high school 37
2 10,18
7.9
3 10,-9,-151
zachary club 34 2 14.5,11.5 7.5
A condensed summary for the limiting behavior of (b/c)∗ for more notable topologies is
presented in Table SI.2. A more comprehensive summary of the limiting behaviors of the
conjoined graphs is presented in Table SI.3.
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TABLE SI.2: Limiting behavior of results for notable topologies
Graph
(
b
c
)∗
Star Inf
Star of Stars 2
Two Stars 5
2
, 3
Ring of Stars 3
2
Clique −(N − 1)
Conjoined Cliques N2
Star of Cliques N
Hierarchy of Cliques N
Ring of Cliques N
The Rich Club −N
Conjoined Rich Clubs Nc
Complete Bipartite Inf
Conjoined Complete Bipartites 2N
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TABLE SI.3: Summary of the limiting behavior of the (b/c)∗ of conjoined networks.
Graph Parameters Limit/Special case
(
b
c
)∗
Star n leaf nodes N/A Inf
Extended Star two layers, each n nodes n→∞ 28
11
≈ 2.55
3-Layer Extended Star three layers, each n nodes n→∞ 106940
41723
≈ 2.56
Imperfect Extended Star Layer one n nodes, Layer two ng nodes ng  n 34
89ng
n ≈ 0.38
ng
n
Star of Stars n leaf nodes, each connected to nd nodes n nd
(
2 +
1
n− 1
)
+
(
1
2
+
1
1− n
)
1
nd
Imperfect Star of Stars n leaf nodes, ng of them connected
to nd nodes
ng  n nd 3
2
+
1
2(ng − 1)
Two Stars: Hub to Leaf Two stars, each with n leaf nodes n→∞ 5
2
Two Stars: Leaf to Leaf Two stars, each with n leaf nodes n→∞ 3
Ring of Stars L stars, each with n leaf nodes n→∞ 3L− 1
2L− 2
Clique n nodes N/A −(n− 1)
Conjoined Cliques two cliques, each with n nodes n→∞ n2
Star of Cliques m cliques, each with n nodes n→∞
(
m
m− 2
)
n− (m+ 8)(m− 1)
(m− 2)2
Connecting Two Cliques via a Star two cliques of size n connecting via
a star of size m
m = n, n→∞ n− 1
2
Hierarchy of Cliques q2 cliques of size n, at the bottom
layer, connected to the base node via
q middle nodes
n→∞
[
q2(2q2 + q + 1)
q2(2q2 + q + 3)− 6q − 4
]
n
Ring of Cliques L cliques of size n n→∞
(
L
L− 2
)
n− (L+ 1)
2 − 5
(L− 2)2
The Rich Club Nc core and Np = N −Nc peripheral nodes N →∞ −2N
3
2Nc − 1
Nc − 1 +
1
18
[
8Nc + 39 +
20
Nc − 1
]
Conjoined Rich Clubs two rich clubs, each with Nc core and
Np peripheral nodes
Np →∞ 4Nc − 32
Complete Bipartite two subsets of nodes with sizes nx and ny N/A Inf
Conjoined Complete Bipartite Graphs two identical complete bipartite
graphs with sizes nx and ny
nx = ny = n→∞ 2n− 1
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